The case studies suggest that performance is influenced by contextual,
structural, and leadership variables. Geography, political culture,
demographics, and a state's economy present opportunities and
challenges to elected leaders, who must choose over time among
alternative and frequently conflicting visions of a state's future.
Higher education systems are a part of these visions as well as
a means to their attainment. Higher education governance structures
define the transactional and institutional environments where
leaders are held accountable for pursuing visions that receive
political sanction.
We begin with the federal models, Illinois and Texas. We follow
with Georgia, where a unified governing board provides a tight
interface between institutions and state government. We then look
at the confederated systems, Florida, New York and California.
We end with Michigan, where institutions are the most loosely
coupled to state government. Table 1 provides a brief description
of each of these models.
Types of State Governance Structures |
||
| Federal Systems |
Texas |
There is a state agency that is neither state government nor higher education, but acts as an interface between state government and institutions. This agency is responsible for all four of the key work processes. Institutions or systems have individual governing boards. |
| Unified Systems |
All degree-granting institutions are governed by a single, consolidated governing board that is responsible for all four key work processes. | |
| Confederated Systems | New York California |
There may be a statewide board with planning and advisory responsibilities, but it has limited authority in the budget process. |
| Confederated Institutions | All or most institutions have individual governing boards. There is no meaningful state agency to which the state has delegated responsibility for the work processes. | |
Information serves as the "glue" that holds the Illinois system
together. IBHE is the collector and coordinator of most of that
information. The list of reports IBHE publishes reads like an
inventory of state priorities. IBHE cost studies provide a rationale
for budget recommendations. The synthesis and related information
IBHE provides for each higher education bill informs legislators,
legislative staff, and the higher education community. To a house
staff member, IBHE is the "institutional memory of higher education."
Illinois is information-rich because IBHE responds quickly to
requests and has been effective at getting legislators and others
to use their services.
The IBHE program review process helps the public higher education
community develop consensus about who should offer which programs
and where. Through this process, institutions develop strong and
well informed proposals, share information about their educational
planning, and receive suggestions from peers about how proposals
might be strengthened. IBHE uses focus statements defining institutional
roles and formal criteria for program approval to exercise reasonable
control over program proliferation. Through its relatively new
Priorities, Quality and Productivity (PQP) Project, IBHE has pressured
institutional governing boards to distinguish their programs on
the basis of priorities, quality and productivity and to reallocate
the resources captured to high quality, higher priority programs.
Institutional leaders credit this program with strengthening their
hand in a state where faculty collective bargaining often limits
leadership options.
Institutional budgets and the use of information by the Board
of Higher Education have been the driving forces behind Illinois'
efforts to achieve priorities. The key to success is getting the
Governor to approve the budget and part of the trade-off is that
the board and institutions of higher education must be receptive
to the messages the Governor sends. Even though the board's statutory
authority extends only to recommendingbudgetary needs for operations and for capital improvements, the
budget process is central to IBHE strategies for coordinating
system activities. Institutions cooperate primarily because a
constitutionally strong Governor regularly accepts IBHE recommendations.
IBHE enhances the informal authority derived from its trust relationships
with the Governor and, to a lesser degree with the Legislature,
by concentrating on rational, responsible budget recommendations,
and by reducing conflict among institutions and sectors.
IBHE coordinates an initiative to improve transfer that is of
relatively recent origin. For much of its history, IBHE has been
unwilling to jeopardize its consensus approach to program decisions
by "arranging marriages" between institutions when the partners-such
as the University of Illinois-have been reluctant to participate
fully. IBHE has also developed a recent initiative to improve
working relationships with K-12. Existing strong relationships
between some two- and four-year colleges and between some higher
education institutions and their K-12 counterparts are more the
product of individual leadership than statewide articulation efforts.
Illinois is one of seven states that treats private institutions
as an integral part of its higher education system. A large student
financial aid program and the actions of IBHE to limit program
duplication help ensure a strong and vigorous private sector.
Privates also get more than $100 million in categorical grants
annually. They provide 40 percent of all bachelor's degrees, 50
percent of master's degrees, and 75 percent of first professional
degrees. Independent colleges and universities voluntarily participated
in the PQP Project, although outcomes regarding the independent
sector are still unclear. They also participate in such discretionary
multi-institutional state programs as the telecommunications agenda,
economic development, minority student achievement, teacher education,
and the improvement of undergraduate education.
Texas
The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), like its
Illinois counterpart, has responsibility for all four of the work
processes. The board is charged with the unified development of
the system, efficient and effective use of resources, elimination
of duplication in program offerings, advocacy of adequate resources
for institutions, and advising of the Legislature on higher education
issues. The Coordinating Board also manages federal and state
student assistance programs. It coordinates community college
funding and oversees statewide articulation activities involving
two- and four-year subsystems. The board is responsible for preparing
a master plan for higher education and for developing the funding
formulas through which 85 to 90 percent of legislative appropriations
are allocated. Individual institutions determine how budgets are
to be spent. The Coordinating Board approves new degree programs
and some construction processes. The board strives to be seen
as an impartial and objective source of information, which can
be provided with or without recommendations by the board. The
Legislature has acted without waiting for board advice, as in
the case of several subsystem realignments that were authorized
during the study. Following this action, however, the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House issued a joint
statement that such realignments would be considered in the future
only after review by the Coordinating Board. The Legislature reserves
the power to set tuition.
The Coordinating Board, which is the primary agency responsible
for collecting data on higher education, regularly gathers information
on faculty assignments, enrollment by class, and individual student-record
data. Board staff members can track students across two- and four-year
sectors to provide cohort data for each institution. The Legislature
receives both technical and policy information from THECB. The
Legislative Budget Board requests fiscal notes from the Coordinating
Board on all higher education bills (300 to 500 per session).
Beyond fiscal notes, the Coordinating Board receives over 200
requests from the Legislature annually for information related
to higher education. Under legislative stimulus, the board has
tried to pull together information on performance, an effort that
has been successfully resisted to date by institutions.
The Coordinating Board works with institutions to develop a mission
statement and a table of corresponding programs. Through the program
approval and review process, the board applies the criteria of
cost, need, and potential excellence to monitor quality and prevent
unnecessary duplication. The review process is most visible at
the doctoral level, where outside consultants are involved. The
board has also adopted a formative quality-review initiative for
community colleges to see if these institutions are performing
their missions as established by the Legislature.
Close to 90 percent of legislative appropriations are distributed
by formulas developed by the Coordinating Board in consultation
with subsystems. While formulas may make it difficult for institutions
to address specific priorities through the budget process, system
participants believe the formula process is fair and that it eliminates
budget battles that might otherwise occur. Despite this budget
process, there is considerably less intra-system equity in Texas
than in the other study states. (Intra-system equity refers to
the extent to which state funding levels for the types of public
institutions within a state system approximate national norms
for those types of institutions.) Two practices, neither under
the jurisdiction of the Coordinating Board, account for the degree
of inequity. The Legislature reserves the right to distribute
from 10 to 15 percent of biannual appropriations on the basis
of special-item funding for which institutional and subsystem
leaders compete. Success is contingent upon the effectiveness
of lobbying efforts and the power of supporting legislators. Even
more important than institution-specific appropriations are the
proceeds from the Permanent University Fund (invested oil revenues)
that go primarily to the University of Texas at Austin and Texas
A & M University.
Most observers told us that transfer and articulation between
two- and four-year institutions are less effective than they should
be. Yet the Coordinating Board did not at the time of our study
have specific initiatives to improve these rates. Community colleges
and universities have developed a common course numbering system
voluntarily, but there is no common core of general education
courses. System discussion of transfer has, however, increased
as a result of concerns about remedial education created by the
Texas Academic Skills Program (TASP), which mandates testing of
basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills for all students
entering higher education. Those who score below established levels
must undergo remediation before they can enroll in upper division
courses.
Private higher education is not actively involved in discussions
of state policy issues. A need-based tuition equalization grant
is the primary means for including independent institutions in
state plans for meeting student demand.
The University System collects general information about enrollments
and costs. Elected leaders reported that information was often
difficult to obtain and that comparable information across institutions
was particularly scarce. The situation may be getting better because
of advances in the use of technology. Despite legislative interest
in accountability, there were no arrangements for reporting performance
at the time of the study, though the University System is trying
to address the issue.
The chancellor's office and the Board of Regents define and modify
institutional missions. Currently, USG institutions are organized
into four categories: research universities, regional universities,
state universities, and two-year colleges. Each category is authorized
to develop specified types of programs. All proposals for new
programs undergo a rigorous preliminary review process by USG
staff before being submitted to the Regents for final approval.
At any point in the process, other institutions can raise questions
about duplication and quality. Recently, the process was changed
to add a five-year probationary period for new programs. At the
time of the study, an external committee was looking at the mission
of the entire system and trying to establish specific identities
or missions for each institution.
The Board of Regents submits a unified budget to the Governor
based on formulas for general support, special initiatives for
specific institutions, a general obligation bond request, payback
projects, minor capital outlay projects, and the salary request.
Each requires its own separate justification. Over 90 percent
of the budget is determined through the formula process. Budget
battles in the Legislature occur most frequently around special
initiative funding. The University System does not use formulas
to allocate money to individual institutions. Those we interviewed
indicated that institutions believe allocation procedures are
fair. In fiscal year 1995, the Regents responded to the Governor's
call for redirecting funding priorities for higher education by
using funding increases for incentives. Tuition and fees are set
at 25 percent of the formulas for instruction, academic support,
and student services. In 1995, the Regents reduced tuition at
two-year colleges by five percent to encourage more students to
begin college at these institutions.
The University System brings institutional administrators together
to discuss educational issues. The core curriculum which all share
is often a focus. The transfer process works fairly well for the
15 two-year colleges within the system. It does not work nearly
as well for the 33 technical institutions that are overseen by
the Georgia Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE).
At the time of our visit, the University System was undergoing
an extensive strategic planning process, led by the chancellor
and the Board of Regents. Among the priorities identified through
this process are: movement toward a semester calendar, a partnership
with DTAE, and a preschool-to-college initiative that aims for
systematic collaboration among all sectors of education.
To address what traditionally have been relatively poor college-going
rates, the Governor instituted a scholarship program in 1993 that
is funded by the lottery. The program, Helping Outstanding Pupils
Educationally (HOPE), provides full tuition and fees to students
who maintain a B average in high school and go on to attend a
public institution in Georgia. Those who maintain that B average
in college continue to receive the award.
Even though private institutions account for about 20 percent
of the higher education enrollments in Georgia, they have not
been actively involved in discussions of state policy issues.
The private sector has been included in the statewide library
system, however, and in discussions surrounding the HOPE scholarships.
Private institutions are also collaborating with their public
counterparts at the local level, particularly through an Atlanta
organization called the University Centers of Georgia, which has
brought together 17 or 18 institutions of all types to find areas
for collaboration.
The SUS chancellor's office develops and manages a statewide database
for public four-year higher education. Most of the information
needed by the Legislature about four-year institutions comes from
this source. While some policy leaders expressed frustration at
the need to rely upon the University System, most said that the
quality and timeliness of information are generally satisfactory
when the desired information is available within the database.
On specific issues, such as the number of excess credit hours
students take and the levels of student income at various institutions,
the Legislature authorizes special studies. There is no statewide
database on community college students and no statewide information
on community college performance. The Legislature produces annual
statistical reports and profiles on higher education.
The Legislature may legitimately tell the University System to
limit student enrollment or, conversely, to take more entering
freshmen. They may not tell the Board of Regents that a new educational
program should or should not be approved or where it should be
located. The chancellor's office gives university presidents a
fair amount of latitude in establishing the missions of their
institutions. Competition for programs tends to occur where two
institutions-like Florida State University and Florida A & M University-are
located in close proximity and compete for some of the same programs.
Decisions about program approval or discontinuance are made by
the SUS office. Local community college trustees exercise similar
authority over program approval at their institutions.
Each public university submits a budget to the SUS office based
on historical allocations, changes in enrollment or institutional
mission, and SUS priorities. The University System submits one
budget directly to the Governor and the Legislature, and receives
a single allocation with five or six major categories. Each campus
receives a lump sum from the University System and distributes
the dollars. There is no agreement between the University System
and the Legislature on how resources should be allocated to the
campuses. For each local community college district, the Legislature
provides a lump-sum allocation derived from enrollment growth,
previous year's base, and the need for new facilities and programs.
Allocations are not affected by enrollment losses, which has resulted
in inter-institutional inequities of as much as $800 per student.
A recent incentive program established by the Legislature encourages
community colleges to give up five percent of their budget in
return for earning back more dollars by demonstrating success
in completions, graduations and placements. Those whom we interviewed
said that the 20 districts that elected to participate gained
experience with the performance-based budgeting plan advocated
by the Governor and the Legislature.
Although there is no single agency in Florida other than the Legislature
with responsibility for articulation and collaboration, there
are many statutory provisions that acknowledge its importance.
Florida's two-plus-two policy promotes the recognition and use
of community colleges as the primary point of entry for postsecondary
education. A statewide articulation agreement guarantees community
college transfers with an associate of arts degree entry to the
upper division of one of the state universities. These students
are not, however, guaranteed their choice of program or institution.
Student transfer is supported by an articulation coordinating
committee, a statewide common course numbering system, discipline-specific
articulation agreements among institutions, a network of institutional
articulation officers, and such acceleration mechanisms as dual
enrollment, early admission, and credit by examination. Despite
this abundance of support programs and services, legislators are
concerned that a substantial number of excess credits are taken
by community college students. There is also concern about the
"bottleneck" in many upper-division majors for both native university
and community college students.
Private higher education, which accounts for 36 percent of Florida's
baccalaureate enrollments, is an integral part of the state's
higher education system. For high demand programs, the state pays
the difference between public university and private institution
tuition. The state also provides need-based tuition equalization
grants for student who choose to attend a private college or university
and offers direct institutional grants to private institutions.
In total, state aid to private institutions now approaches more
than $53 million annually. Statewide master planning, coordinated
by PEPC, is the process used to draw the private colleges and
universities into the overall higher education system in Florida.
New York
In the State of New York, higher education's governing structures
and processes must be understood in the context of the overarching
state regulatory agencies that permeate them. Most staff (other
than faculty) of the State University of New York (SUNY) are employees
of the state, subject to civil service regulations and collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by the Governor's Office of Employee
Relations. Tuition is effectively controlled by statutory restrictions
upon differentials and limits on the authority of trustees to
set tuition schedules. Expenditure and contract authority, except
for specific exemptions, is reserved to the state. The Division
of the Budget has the authority to alter downward the legally
approved budgets for SUNY and the City University of New York
(CUNY) if the state budget is out of balance. The New York Board
of Regents has responsibility for preparing a master plan for
all of higher education in the state, public and private. Prior
to 1995, master plans were developed every four years with amendments
every two years. When Governor Pataki came into office, this planning
process was lengthened to eight years with amendments every four.
The Regents also have ultimate program approval authority in the
state. The State Higher Education Services Corporation is responsible
for the administration of student financial aid. All public higher
education institutions are organized into two geographically distinct,
heterogeneous subsystems, each with its own appointed governing
board. SUNY has many small and diverse campuses that are widely
dispersed across the state outside New York City. The 30 community
college districts within SUNY have local governing boards. CUNY
appears more like a subsystem due to: its history as a city university
in which campuses enjoyed substantial autonomy, a relatively specific
mission without the "prestige pyramid" found in SUNY, the geographical
proximity of campuses and public transportation, and a graduate
center that serves the entire subsystem. CUNY negotiates its own
collective bargaining agreements and has close relationships with
the political power base in New York City government, which provides
the local share of funding for CUNY's six community colleges.
The Regents monitor graduation rates and require institutions
to publish time-to-degree information, including successful completion
of licensing examinations. The Regents are also working on other
performance indicators that would reflect the separate directions
that institutions set. The independent sector relies on information
collected by the Regents and uses it to support their requests
to the Legislature. SUNY central staff believe that good information
about performance and relative levels of quality and activity
at different institutions is available, but that neither the central
office nor the SUNY Board of Trustees has used it to the extent
they should. The CUNY central office is upgrading its management
system, but does not at present have the capacity to collect needed
information from campuses.
In theory, institutional missions are defined and modified in
the eight-year statewide plans prepared by the Regents from information
submitted by CUNY, SUNY, and private institutions-and then approved
by the Governor. In fact, the missions of SUNY campuses appear
to be defined loosely by such functional types as universities,
four-year colleges, and two-year colleges. Campus missions may
be modified by the Regents' program reviews when new major programs
are proposed or existing ones reviewed. The Regents' reviews focus
on quality and have been credited with keeping "degree mills"
out of the state. In the 1970s, the Regents terminated several
doctoral programs at SUNY, an action that was subsequently upheld
in the courts. SUNY does not appear to have any active programs
for monitoring program quality or productivity. It does review
campus proposals for new programs for unnecessary duplication
before forwarding them to the Regents. CUNY has a more specific
mission than SUNY, calling for the strongest commitment to the
special needs of its urban constituency. Through a recently adopted
planning process, CUNY is beginning to review all programs for
unnecessary duplication and productivity. It is not clear that
this process reaches, or tries to define, quality.
Until recently, the budget requests of both SUNY and CUNY have
been aggregations of campus requests after internal review. At
present both subsystems are maintaining this approach for such
core items as salary increases and inflation, but are consolidating
special campus requests and tying them to subsystem-wide initiatives.
Neither SUNY nor CUNY uses explicitly enrollment-driven formulas
in developing budgets. The Governor's budget is lump-sum form,
but the Legislature attaches riders with line items for specific
campuses. Aside from the Governor's objective of reducing expenditures,
there do not seem to be any explicit state priorities to which
allocations are tied. SUNY and CUNY exercise reasonable authority
to allocate appropriations among campuses cautiously. In SUNY,
increases have been allocated essentially "across-the-board."
Allocations in SUNY are perceived as essentially fair, although
there are concerns among larger institutions about the high costs
of maintaining small campuses. There are also concerns at SUNY
about the significantly higher operating costs for the statutory
colleges at Alfred and Cornell Universities. CUNY has begun to
allocate funds to campuses to reflect the chancellor's priorities,
as reflected by the decision to fund a central institute for English
as a Second Language with funds requested for campus programs.
CUNY also uses its control over new faculty positions to encourage
compliance with subsystem priorities. New York has the most equitable
intra-system allocations among the seven states, meaning that
state funding for its types of public institutions closely approximate
the national norms for those institutional types.
Responsibility for collaboration and articulation is implicit
in the heterogeneous SUNY and CUNY structures. SUNY has tried
to improve articulation by giving additional funds to four-year
colleges based on their enrollments of two-year college graduates.
Those we interviewed said that they believe that articulation
works well within each of the subsystems. CUNY was perceived as
more focused and more responsive to changing financial circumstances
than SUNY. This difference seemed due to CUNY leadership, geographic
proximity, and institutional traditions that include consortia
arrangements. The Regents' broad responsibilities for both higher
and basic education does not appear to have strengthened coordination
or collaboration between schools and colleges, except in the area
of teacher education. Both subsystems do have institutional initiatives
that aim at closer working relationships with the public schools.
The 107 private colleges and universities in New York dominated
higher education for more than two centuries. They still enroll
40 percent of the state's students and produce 58 percent of the
baccalaureate degrees, 69 percent of the graduate degrees, and
83 percent of first professional degrees. Bundy Aid, administered
by the Regents, provides approximately $40 million annually (down
from $100 million in 1990) directly to private institutions based
on the number of degrees they award. About 40 percent of the students
in private institutions participate in the need-based Tuition
Assistance Program (TAP), which is an entitlement program. The
major vehicle for private sector participation in policy decisions
is the Regents' program review process, where public and private
institutions compete to offer new major programs.
California
The California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), which
serves as an advisory agency to the Legislature, Governor, and
postsecondary institutions, has statutory authority to establish
a statewide database, to review institutional budgets, to advise
on the need for and location of new campuses, and to review all
proposals for new academic programs in the public sector. While
the commission was founded to be an independent voice on higher
education, there are not a lot of teeth in the legislation. A
voluntary coordinating committee, the California Roundtable, supplements
CPEC, periodically waxing and waning depending upon leadership
provided by the California State University (CSU) and the University
of California (UC). The California system was designed to maximize
the influence of professionals and to minimize external intrusions,
and it achieves that objective. Institutions of public higher
education are divided into three tiers with single governing boards
for the two four-year segments and a coordinating Board of Governors
for locally governed community colleges. UC Regents do not evaluate
the president, who is a voting member of the Regents, and they
do not receive information about the relative performance of the
nine campuses they oversee. They typically do not get involved
either in curriculum decisions or in actions involving academic
personnel, as they have formally delegated these decisions to
the academic senates. Much of the work on the budget is done without
input from the Regents and they do not approve the formula used
to distribute legislative allocations among campuses. The university
is the only public segment in California with constitutional status.
Although subject to less regulation than in the past, the 22-campus
California State University still faces significant state control
because it lacks the constitutional status of the UC subsystem.
Among community colleges, the role of the state coordinating board
remains unclear and faculty dominate local governance through
the trustees they help to elect, the collective bargaining agreements
local boards subsequently negotiate, and through shared governance,
which seems to cover any contingency not resolved through collective
bargaining. Many policy makers view community colleges in their
present structure as essentially ungovernable. The primary powers
reserved to the state (apart from close regulation of CSU and
community colleges) involve the determination of annual appropriations
for each segment (attenuated in the case of community colleges
by voter initiatives) and the appointment of members of the UC
Regents, the CSU Trustees and the community college Board of Governors.
A separate Student Aid Commission administers state and federal
student financial aid programs. Periodically, the Legislature
or the Governor commissions studies of the Master Plan. Past reviews
have been more noteworthy for the political battles they generated
than for the amount of change they instituted.
Providing information may be CPEC's most important current function.
Annual CPEC reports deal with such issues as faculty salaries,
executive compensation, and higher education performance. There
are fact books on fiscal profiles and student profiles as well
as topical reports in such areas as: "three strikes" legislation;
plans for record student enrollment levels expected over the next
decade; improved outcomes; and community college student charges.
CPEC's credibility in producing these reports is impaired by the
degree to which the commission must rely on subsystem sources
for data. Most policy makers believe the reports raise only those
issues that the segments want to raise, and that the segments
do not make an effort to provide information that might put them
in a bad light. The Department of Finance, and the Office of the
Legislative Analyst also publish occasional reports on higher
education issues. UC receives the most criticism for the quality,
accuracy, and timeliness of the information it provides to those
outside the university. Most respondents indicated that CSU has
been better about furnishing information. Since the two segments
see themselves as being in competition with each other, they are
careful about what information is furnished to whom. Information
about community colleges is difficult to characterize because
its sources are so diverse and fragmented. While some districts
provide excellent information to their local constituencies, the
overall picture is confused and chaotic. In the current policy
environment, it is not clear that more or better information would
necessarily have much impact. The Governor vetoed a student information
system for CPEC that had been approved by the Legislature. The
Governor and Legislature find it much easier to cut deals with
segment heads on the basis of political philosophy and available
resources than to try to make sense out of data pried from reluctant
segments.
Institutional missions are embedded in the Master Plan. In the
more than 30 years that have passed since the Plan was adopted,
it has been revisited five times, most recently in 1986. While
there have been a number of attempts to reform community college
governance, the original allocation of jurisdictional responsibilities
has remained intact. The program review process is primarily campus-based.
There is a fairly serious review of new programs and programs
considered for discontinuation by the four-year subsystem offices.
CPEC keeps an inventory of programs and must review new majors,
new programs (the School of Public Administration, for example),
or joint doctoral programs. While there is some question as to
whether CPEC could prevent a degree or program from being offered,
the subsystems typically work with CPEC to negotiate around problems
that develop. Community college districts can offer new courses-but
not new programs-without approval from the statewide Board of
Governors. In approving programs, the board looks only at duplication
with the offerings at nearby community colleges and does not consider
the impact on other parts of California higher education.
Subsystem heads interact directly with state government in the
annual budgeting process. The Department of Finance develops the
budget that is introduced by the Governor. The Budget and Finance
Committees in the Senate and Assembly consider higher education
as part of the single central budget that includes all state expenditures.
The Office of the Legislative Analyst is the nonpartisan body
that has responsibility for reviewing budgets. Recently, the Governor
has taken a direct role in the budgeting process by negotiating
agreements with the segment heads for UC and CSU. The president's
office coordinates the development of a unified budget for the
University of California. Priorities are the result of meetings
among the chancellors and their planning and budgeting vice chancellors.
Once the Legislature has made its lump-sum appropriation, funds
are divided among campuses through a formula determined by the
university. Campuses have substantial latitude over the funds
they receive through whatever formula the subsystem agrees upon.
The California State University develops a unified budget request
that articulates priorities previously discussed with the Executive
Council, which is composed of the chancellor and campus presidents.
Allocations are heavily enrollment-driven with a base for each
campus to which incremental changes are made based on changes
in enrollment. Apart from special circumstances, institutions
can gain or lose two percent in enrollment without affecting their
base funding level. Campuses negotiate with the chancellor for
additional monies that may be available based on increases or
decreases in enrollment, enrollment targets and subsystem initiatives.
State appropriations for community colleges are driven by Proposition
98, which requires that 40 percent of general fund revenues go
to public schools with an unspecified proportion reserved for
community colleges. In practice, that proportion has hovered around
11 percent. Allocations to districts are formula driven and largely
incremental since the amount of funding for enrollments is capped.
Tuition and fees are set by the state. The state also has about
20 categorical programs ranging from disabled students through
economic development and increasing transfer rates. Together these
programs represent from 10 to 15 percent of the total appropriation.
Community colleges are widely regarded in California as seriously
underfunded. Within each of the three segments, intra-system allocations
are reasonably equitable, ranking slightly below the national
average.
California provides many examples of collaborative activity between
individual institutions. In California, however, no one is in
charge of articulation. There is general agreement that the subsystems
need to work together more closely to be sure that students are
prepared to succeed. The Intersegmental Coordinating Council (the
operating arm of the Education Roundtable) serves as a voluntary
arrangement for working across segmental boundaries. Whatever
is not worked out voluntarily is left to the Legislature. The
Legislature has tried to fill the coordination vacuum with transfer
centers, course articulation numbering systems, a mandated general
education core, and, most recently, a common course numbering
system. Transfer works reasonably well between community colleges
and the state university, which is very dependent upon transfers
to fill upper division classes. It works less well with the University
of California despite the strong influence UC exercises over core
courses, not only for community colleges but for CSU as well.
Even where it works well, there are problems. CPEC tries to keep
score on transfer successes and failures, but its efforts are
inhibited by the absence of a student information system that
permits cohort tracking.
Private institutions have a distinctive niche in California higher
education that has not been fully exploited, partly because the
California Constitution prohibits direct support to private entities.
Private institutions enroll 22 percent of all undergraduates in
four-year institutions, 48 percent of master's degree students,
60 percent of those seeking doctoral degrees, and 67 percent of
those pursuing first professional degrees. Language inserted in
the 1987 Master Plan revision requires the state to consider the
capacity and utilization of the private sector in making planning
decisions. Current estimates suggest that the private sector might
be able to supply from 10,000 to 40,000 slots, or about ten percent
of the projected enrollment surge expected over the next decade.
There are three main points of contact for independent colleges
with the rest of higher education: Cal Grants; the Cal Higher
Facilities Bonding Authority; and voluntary informal relationships
such as the California Higher Education Roundtable. While a representative
of the private sector sits on the Roundtable, and individual presidents
of major institutions like Stanford have influence in the state,
the overall impact of the private sector in California remains
weak.
Michigan has no information about the performance or participation
of minority groups, the success of remedial education, how money
is being spent, or what the state receives for its investment
in higher education. Most of the information that is collected
and used for any sort of analysis for universities goes into the
Higher Education Information Data Inventory (HEIDI), which resides
in the Department of Management and Budget (DMB). HEIDI is oriented
to provide expenditure and faculty compensation data rather than
performance data. Those who use the database describe it as inadequate
and inaccurate. HEIDI is not compatible with the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) database, which resides in the state
Department of Education. The department has made several attempts
to get funding to improve information collection and dissemination,
but four-year institutions have been successful in defeating these
efforts. Because the department has responsibility for approving
programs for institutions receiving federal funds, community colleges
have regularly collected and reported information to ensure eligibility.
Universities prefer to limit data collection to the DMB because
that is where their budget decisions are made.
Individual institutions define and modify their own missions.
A voluntary approval process for new programs for universities
is operated under the auspices of the Presidents Council, which
provides a check on quality, but does not limit program duplication.
If a program fails to win approval, it will not be added to the
"boiler plate" language in the legislative appropriation. Failure
to win approval is not necessarily a deterrent, as evident from
the pharmacy school at Ferris State and the engineering program
at Grand Valley State, both of which were not approved but were
implemented anyway. Universities have also begun to establish
centers across the state where they offer bachelor's and master's
degrees, sometimes without the requirement of attending the main
campus. No one (other than the regional accrediting association)
has responsibility for monitoring such institutional decisions,
which have resulted in further program duplication. Community
colleges present fewer problems due to their geographic boundaries
and because the state Department of Education must approve programs
that receive federal funds.
The only way for state government to influence higher education
in Michigan is through the budget process. Universities submit
their requests to DMB. Budget requests include information on
current and prior year FTE positions, faculty salaries, enrollments,
and tuition and fee rates. DMB pays little attention to the requests
because they invariably are too high. DMB calculates the increase
for higher education by looking at the percentage of revenue growth
for the state. Funding is based primarily on historical funding
patterns over the past 30 years. While the Legislature is attentive
to the priorities of the Governor, it typically provides a lump
sum to each institution at a common rate of increase. Institutions
can spend their appropriation as they see fit. When enrollment
growth outpaced funding at some institutions, the Presidents Council
successfully called for a one-time infusion of funding into the
base budget to establish a minimum funding floor per student.
A funding increase for Michigan State University (MSU) in 1995-96,
engineered by the Governor without council endorsement, created
controversy and hard feelings. Generally, however, institutions
view the allocation process as fair as long as the "pecking order"
is maintained. Community colleges are funded by a formula that
is largely driven by changes in enrollment. The formula does not
penalize institutions that experience enrollment declines. The
formula is never fully funded and not even fully used, since about
half of the increases for this segment are typically distributed
across the board. Michigan stands at the national average in terms
of the equity of its intra-system allocations.
The relationship between institutions of higher education and
K-12 schools was described by interviewees as relatively poor.
Language in the fiscal year 1996 appropriation bill called for
institutions of higher education to report information on the
performance of students to the high schools they graduated from,
but the language is not binding because of constitutional autonomy.
There are also dual enrollment programs that allow high school
seniors to enroll in college or university courses for credit,
with the state paying the tuition. A transfer agreement between
two- and four-year institutions developed in the 1970s by the
Michigan Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers
defines the courses that would be accepted by each signatory as
fulfilling general education requirements. The agreement is of
limited value because not all of the state's four-year institutions
have signed it, and those who did sign it subscribe to its provisions
to varying degrees. Apart from local efforts at articulation,
the state Board of Education publishes transfer surveys primarily,
we were told, to embarrass universities that have poor records
for accepting and graduating community college transfers.
Private institutions enroll about 15 percent of the FTE student enrollment in Michigan. The private sector is included in state policy decisions to the extent that the state provides $425 for each general bachelor's or master's degree awarded by a private institution, and half that amount for an associate degree. Private institutions also receive approximately $2,000 for each bachelor's or master's degree awarded in a health field that required clinical experience or state licensing. Because the state does not want to open an additional dental school, it provides a flat grant of $4 million annually to the University of Detroit's Mercy Dental School. There is also a need-based tuition grant program for students attending private institutions and three other small financial aid programs. Financial aid programs in Michigan do not compare-in terms of dollar amounts-with the much larger aid programs in New York, Illinois or Florida.
Constitutional Factors Affecting Governance Structures |
|||
State |
|||
| Illinois | No public institutions have constitutional status. | ||
| Texas | No public institutions have constitutional status. | ||
| Georgia | University System of Georgia institutions all have constitutional status. | ||
| Florida | No public institutions have constitutional status. | ||
| New York | No public institutions have constitutional status. | ||
| California | University of California has constitutional status; other public systems do not. | ||
| Michigan | All four-year public institutions have constitutional status. | ||
| * From J. M. Burns, J. W. Peltason, and T. E. Cronin, State and Local Politics: Government by the People (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 113. | |||
Illinois
Illinois has a constitutionally strong Governor who historically
has exercised leadership on higher education issues. In 1961,
the state established a system of subsystems for higher education
that was coordinated by the Illinois Board of Higher Education
(IBHE), which was given relatively weak statutory authority. This
system of subsystems was created partly to bring together and
thereby improve the capacity of several smaller four-year institutions
to compete with the University of Illinois (U of I) and Southern
Illinois University (SIU), which remained as separate subsystems.
One of the first actions of the new board was to create a network
of locally governed community colleges, coordinated by a state
community college board, which in turn was made subordinate to
IBHE. Private, nonprofit institutions, historically strong in
urban areas, were defined as an integral part of the Illinois
system in the late 1960s, thereby limiting the growth of public
four-year institutions. Concurrently, Illinois created a need-based
Monetary Award Program to assist undergraduates. By 1994, this
program was the third largest in the nation. In 1995, the Legislature
ended the system of subsystems by abolishing two subsystem boards
and replacing them with individual governing boards for seven
of the eight affected institutions. Faculty in most higher education
institutions other than the University of Illinois are organized
for collective bargaining.
Texas
In Texas, which has a constitutionally weak Governor, leadership
on higher education issues has come from the Legislature and the
Lieutenant Governor. In contrast to the "orderly and rational"
Illinois system, higher education in Texas seems "ever-changing"
and "unplanned." Actions that converted two-year colleges into
four-year colleges and that created upper division institutions
that subsequently added a lower division were based on growth
but not on planning. Those we interviewed agreed that governance
structures are primarily the result of political influence. Depending
upon whom one asks, however, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating
Board (THECB) was created in 1965 either as "an attempt by the
Legislature to limit its own discretion," as an attempt "to coordinate
the disorganization," or as a referee or scapegoat to keep subsystems
from having to make unpopular decisions. Regardless of how its
role is characterized, the Coordinating Board must carry out its
system responsibilities-for 40 public four-year institutions organized
in a mix of six multi-institution subsystems and four free-standing
campuses; 50 community college districts; and 40 private institutions-in
an environment that often involves antagonism both from the Legislature
and from some of the subsystems.
Georgia
Georgia's Governor exercises significant influence on higher education
through his powers of appointment and his influence on the budget
process. The current Governor has made higher education a priority.
The Georgia system is the most simple of the seven in its design.
A 1931 decision placed all degree-granting institutions under
the supervision of a single governing board. Following a 1941
attempt by the Governor to intervene in the hiring and firing
of administrators, the state ratified an amendment that gave the
board constitutional status to govern, control, and manage the
system. In 1996, the University of Georgia system included 15
two-year and 19 four-year institutions. Two-year institutions
have been used less extensively than in other study states.
Florida
Florida has a constitutionally weak Governor. The Appropriations
Committees of the House and Senate make most of the important
decisions about higher education spending. Under single-party
domination, past governors have provided significant leadership
on higher education issues, but with the emergence of a more competitive
political system, gubernatorial influence has weakened. The history
of the Florida system includes legislative control extending to
individual salaries, campus locations, size of buildings, and
expansion of academic programs. In 1956, the state created an
ambitious state community college subsystem. In 1968, community
colleges gained independent governing boards appointed by the
Governor and in 1979 a weak coordinating board whose powers were
strengthened somewhat in 1983. Until the establishment of a single
governing board for all four-year institutions in 1965, four-year
institutions operated under the supervision of a state Board of
Control. The Board of Regents, which replaced the Board of Control,
was described by many interviewees as "control-oriented" in its
relationships with the ten campuses that currently comprise the
subsystem. In addition to the state Board of Education, which
is comprised of elected cabinet heads, the Postsecondary Education
Planning Commission (PEPC) has provided information and policy
analysis to the Legislature and Governor since 1980. Faculty in
the State University System and in most community colleges are
organized under the terms of a weak collective bargaining statute.
New York
A constitutionally strong Governor in New York State has historically
exercised leadership on higher education issues. A full-time Legislature
divided between upstate Republicans who dominate the Senate and
downstate (urban) Democrats who control the Assembly serves as
"custodians" of higher education with a "fairly significant role"
in setting the missions for the public campuses. In 1948, a diverse
collection of two- and four-year institutions located outside
New York City were combined under a single governing board as
the State University of New York (SUNY). By 1996, the subsystem
had grown to 64 campuses, five of which were "statutory colleges"
located at private Cornell University and Alfred University. Within
SUNY are 30 community colleges, each governed by its own appointed
board of trustees. Through a similar metamorphosis, the City University
of New York (CUNY) grew from two four-year institutions under
a single governing board in 1926 into a merged two- and four-year
subsystem in 1961, and ultimately to a subsystem of 13 four-year
and 6 community colleges, all located in New York City. Despite
these developments, private institutions dominated higher education
until the 1960s. A state agency, the University of the State of
New York Board of Regents, dating from 1784, has responsibilities
for all education and provides limited coordination for higher
education in areas related to quality assurance, long-range planning,
and equity and access. A separate state agency administers student
aid. CUNY has one of the first and strongest faculty unions in
any public setting in the United States. Collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated for SUNY (excluding community colleges)
by the Governor's Office of Employee Relations.
California
California has a constitutionally strong Governor whose influence
on higher education is pivotal, but recent governors have not
exercised much leadership on higher education issues. Voter initiatives
(including property tax limitations, income and inheritance tax
limitations, set asides for public schools and community colleges,
and term limits for legislators) and a severe recession have restricted
state revenues as well as the continuity and freedom of action
of elected state officials. The 1960 California Master Plan recognized
three subsystems, each with its own, defined clientele and specified
program authority. Constitutional status, as interpreted by a
series of court decisions during the 1970s, lead many to describe
the nine-campus University of California (UC), governed by a single
Board of Regents, as "the fourth branch of state government."
A powerful universitywide Faculty Senate dominates the process
of selecting campus and university leaders and consults directly
with the Regents on all policy decisions. The 22-campus California
State University (CSU), under a single Board of Trustees has a
history of being micro-managed by state agencies. The state university
also has had administrative/faculty tensions that have resulted
in statewide faculty collective bargaining. Community college
districts with elected local governing boards have existed since
1921. Their fiscal status became problematic in 1979, however,
when a voter initiative effectively ended governing board authority
to levy local taxes. The 1979 initiative did not affect responsibilities
for negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Reviews of the
California Master Plan for Higher Education in 1974 resulted in
replacing the Coordinating Council for Higher Education with the
California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), charged
with advising the Governor, legislators and institutions of higher
education on major educational policies. A 1988 review led to
a strengthened statewide Board of Governors for coordinating the
community colleges, as well as shared authority for community
college faculty, who were already highly organized for collective
bargaining.
Michigan
Michigan's constitutionally strong Governor is the state's most
influential higher education leader. An historically powerful
Legislature recently has been challenged by shifting political
currents and term limits. The University of Michigan (UM) was
the first institution in the nation to be accorded constitutional
status (in 1850), partly as a result of political interference
in its operations, including legislative and gubernatorial involvement
in the selection and removal of faculty. Three subsequent constitutional
revisions have preserved and strengthened the state's tradition
of institutional autonomy, extending constitutional status to
other senior institutions in the state. Each institution and the
UM subsystem has its own governing board with those for Michigan
State University (MSU), Wayne State University and UM chosen in
statewide elections. Michigan's 29 community colleges, each with
its own elected governing board, serve about 80 percent of the
state's population. There is no dominant private university. Many
of the 14 or 15 percent of the students served by the private
sector are enrolled in career programs in business and other vocational/technical
fields. While the 1963 constitution assigned the Board of Education
and its advisory Community College Board with planning and coordinating
responsibilities for higher education (consistent with the constitutional
status of institutions), subsequent court decisions and funding
cuts have completely eroded any responsibility that the Board
of Education might have been intended to exercise for higher education.
Both the universities and the community colleges have developed
separate arrangements for voluntary coordination. With the exception
of UM, MSU, and Grand Valley State University, faculty at all
Michigan institutions have collective bargaining agreements.
Despite the absence of major contextual changes, elected leaders-particularly
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor-sent strong messages to higher
education to prioritize, to emphasize quality, "to do what you
do best." Legislators invested in technology to provide a different
form of access through distance learning. Elected leaders and
their appointees also emphasized the quality of undergraduate
instruction, affordability, productivity, efficiency and accountability.
Texas
In Texas the most important change in context involves a projected
growth of 100,000 students (12.5 percent) from 1994 to 2000, with
disproportionate increases among the minority population. If Texas
is successful in increasing participation rates among minorities
so that they equal those for Anglos, the projected increase in
enrollments would more than double. The economy has recovered
from a severe recession in the late 1980s, but higher education
will face increasing competition for state resources. The best
guess is that the growth in enrollment and student diversity will
outstrip the current capabilities of the higher education system
in the absence of significant change.
Priorities for higher education in Texas must be inferred more
from legislative action than drawn from official statements. Higher
education is always a priority for the Legislature even though
this is not overtly stated. Legislators support access through
a policy of low tuition in all public institutions. They are also
interested in quality and accountability, as is evident from legislative
support of the rising junior exam, legislative backing for the
remediation embodied in the Texas Academic Skills Program (TASP),
and two unsuccessful legislative attempts to implement performance
funding. Through competitive programs for funding faculty research
and advanced technology applications, the Legislature has spent
more than $650 million each biennium since 1987 in support of
a priority for economic development. And the criteria used by
the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) in its program
review process, with tacit support from the Legislature, include
cost, need and quality.
Georgia
The Georgia economy has been strong and has grown in the 1990s
as it has changed from a predominantly rural to a predominantly
urban one. The state passed a lottery under the leadership of
the current Governor, who has jealously guarded the proceeds as
a supplement to education dollars. The possibility of fewer resources
in the future as a result of the passage of tax reduction legislation
has been addressed in part through a proposal from the Governor
calling for all state agencies, including higher education, to
redirect five percent of their budgets. Enrollments in the University
System of Georgia increased by 50 percent from 1985 to 1995 with
an additional 11 percent expected by the year 2000. Given that
the higher education system has already made significant changes
to position itself for the next century, additional strategic
responses should be sufficient to cope with foreseeable contextual
change.
While elected leaders actively identify and support priorities
for higher education, as evidenced by the focus on access of the
HOPE scholarships, many of the priorities arise from within the
constitutionally autonomous system. At the same time, the current
chancellor, who is highly regarded by elected leaders, spends
much of his time communicating with the Governor and legislators
to ensure support for priorities which, if not announced by elected
leaders, are cleared with them in advance. The chancellor's priorities-for
a seamless preschool-through-college education system, accountability,
quality in academic programs, and the development of human resources-are
all supported by the Governor. The Governor and the Legislature
also have endorsed the system's success in preventing mission
creep and in strategic planning to promote excellence, collaboration
and the efficient division of responsibilities.
Florida
Florida experienced a severe recession in the early 1990s, when
state revenues were stagnant for three years. The absence of a
sales tax and citizen-led initiatives setting revenue and spending
limits will make funding higher education increasingly problematic
and competitive. At the same time, both the younger and older
populations are growing, which is placing increased pressures
on social services. It will be difficult for the higher education
system to respond to a changing economy and increasing diversity
in age and ethnicity without significant changes to the way higher
education is currently delivered in Florida.
Elected officials set the policy agenda for higher education through
a political process that some campus actors perceive as micro-management
focused around specific strategies. As in Texas, priorities for
higher education in Florida must be inferred from legislative
actions as well as from the statements of public officials. The
high priority placed on efficiency and improved productivity is
apparent from the initiative to limit the number of state-funded
credit hours for associate and baccalaureate degrees as well as
the Governor's emphasis on performance-based budgeting and accountability.
The Legislature remains committed to maintaining access through
low tuition. The state's focus on economic development can be
found in its efforts to create a highly skilled work force and
in the importance placed on applied research. The Legislature
has also introduced salary incentives for exemplary teaching and
has reduced the importance of its rising junior exam (CLAST) as
a "gatekeeper" to the baccalaureate degree by allowing students
to demonstrate academic readiness through such alternatives as
good grades.
New York
Public and private higher education sectors in the State of New
York operate in an intensely competitive and partisan political
environment. The most important contextual change was the election
of a Governor on a platform that promised to cut taxes and shrink
government. Although cuts have not been as extensive as the Governor
originally proposed, both CUNY and SUNY received significant reductions
in state funding in 1995 and 1996. The Governor's attempts to
reduce state funding have increased competition for funds. Although
the state economy suffered in the early 1990s, it has now leveled
off. While there are no significant enrollment increases forecast
for SUNY, a probable increase in demand by lower income groups
has been projected by CUNY. CUNY also expects increasing numbers
of non-English-speaking immigrants. Based on the current political
environment and the Governor's priorities, it is not difficult
to make the case that higher education in New York State faces
the need for significant change.
Many people we interviewed said that the current Governor's priorities
for higher education are improving educational outcomes within
the two public subsystems while simultaneously enhancing economies
of scale. The Assembly safeguards such CUNY interests as access,
while the Senate focuses more on quality, economic development,
and SUNY. Some believe that differences between the two chambers
of the Legislature are more significant for higher education than
the Governor's priorities. Most agree that no one is really looking
out for the whole picture.
California
California continues its recovery from the worst recession since
1929. The effects of the recession are apparent in a relatively
high unemployment rate, more low-paying and fewer high-paying
jobs, a slippage in the educational levels of some segments of
the labor force, and growth in the younger nonworking population.
California is the most diverse state in the United States, with
close to one-third of its population comprised of non-Caucasian
groups. Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing minority.
The Asian-American population is also growing rapidly. Four out
of every five new Californians in the 21st century will be either
of Hispanic or Asian origin. Student enrollment in higher education
is expected to increase by over 450,000 students over the next
decade, an increase of about 28 percent. Opinion is divided on
the magnitude of the response required by higher education to
address these contextual changes. Leaders within each of the public
subsystems believe that the sum of their individual responses
will add up to what the state needs if there is sufficient funding.
Concurrently, interviews with California leaders and the general
public conducted by Public Agenda, as well as our own interviews,
revealed little confidence that higher education issues can be
addressed with real purposefulness within the existing system.
The political environment sends few clear messages to higher education
because of shifting political philosophies, uncertainties about
the effects of term limits, the autonomy of the University of
California, and the difficulties in governing the community colleges.
Most refer to the priorities of access and quality embedded in
the Master Plan, while concurrently acknowledging the state's
inability to continue funding higher education at the same levels
as in the past. A budget compact between the Governor and heads
of the two four-year subsystems suggests continuing concern for
access and affordability, as do the Governor's and Legislature's
actions in buying out the first two of four years of agreed-upon
tuition increases. In addition to access and affordability, some
legislators attach importance to economic development through
research, quality of instruction, and improved collaboration with
the K-12 system. Underlying modest efforts to revisit state priorities
is a sense of considerable complacency with what the higher education
system currently delivers as long as the system does not cost
too much money nor conflict with the Governor and Legislature.
Michigan
After years of fiscal crisis due to downsizing in the auto industry,
Michigan is now experiencing relatively stable economic growth
but growing budgetary pressures from corrections and Medicaid.
The state faces only moderate growth in higher education enrollments.
The most unsettling contextual change was the imposition of term
limits, which some believe will create a more activist Legislature
with greater interest in obtaining information about how appropriations
are being spent. Term limits may also threaten the "pecking order"
of institutions and the practice of providing incremental budget
increases without regard for institutional growth, decline, or
performance. Stable resources and declining numbers of high school
graduates appear to insulate Michigan higher education from the
need for significant change.
Elected leaders have been supportive of higher education. While there is no consensus about what the state looks for from its higher education system, implicit priorities include economic development, efficiency, quality, relevance, and affordability. Affordability was the single issue most commonly cited by those we interviewed as a state priority, reflecting Michigan's highest-in-the-nation tuition charges. Beyond affordability, the Governor has also been concerned about productivity as reflected in two actions: his veto of the Highland Park Community College appropriation on the grounds of mismanagement and declining enrollments; and his controversial attempt to alter the general across-the-board appropriations for all four-year institutions to reward those institutions that limited tuition increases and had productivity improvements.
Performance Measures for the Study States and the U.S. Average |
||||||||
| Cost Per Public Student* (1995-96) |
||||||||
| State Appropriations plus Tuition per FTE |
||||||||
| State Appropriations per FTE | ||||||||
| Access** (Fall 1994) |
||||||||
| Equity§ (1994-95) |
||||||||
| Affordability*** (1994-95) | ||||||||
| % Family Share of Total Funding | ||||||||
| Median Income/ Two-Year Tuition |
||||||||
| Adequacy of Need-Based Aid | ||||||||
| Retention**** (1994-95) | ||||||||
| * The cost per student is the total of state appropriations plus
tuition divided by the FTE in the public sector. Under this heading
we also report state appropriations to the public sector divided
by FTE, in order to provide a measure of state support through
direct funding to institutions. *** Access is the proportion of high school graduates starting college anywhere. §Equity (termed equitable opportunity by Halstead) is an index of the degree to which minority students graduate from high school, enter state colleges, and graduate relative to the retention of white students as a state standard. ** Affordability is the family share of total funding. Under this category we also show the relationship between median income and two-year college tuition, and the ratio of available need-based aid to the amount required for a needy youth to enroll at an in-state public four-year college. **** Retention is the ratio of the starting rate for high school graduates to the retention rate for first-time freshmen indexed to the national average. Sources: K. Halstead, State Profiles: Financing Public Higher Education 1978 to 1996: Trend Data(Washington, D.C.: Research Associates of Washington, 1996); and K. Halstead, Higher Education Report Card 1995(Washington, D.C.: Research Associates of Washington, 1996). |
||||||||
Strong legislative leadership over Florida higher education results
in state and subsystem leaders that have extensive political as
well as educational experience. Legislative and subsystem leadership
in Florida overshadow campus leadership, but this did not seem
to be a source of concern for those we interviewed. In the State
University of New York, recent direct confrontations between chancellors
and the Governor have contributed to rapid turnover. Institutional
presidents, however, are selected by local boards and the SUNY
office does not interfere with the selection process very much.
The CUNY chancellor has fared better in terms of longevity, perhaps
because she is better buffered from direct actions by the Governor.
While CUNY presidents are appointed by the subsystem governing
board, there is a long tradition of substantial institutional
independence, somewhat eroded under current leadership. The recent
record of UC leadership has been marred by actions that have shaken
public confidence. Leaders in the UC subsystem come most commonly
from within and reflect the values of faculty who play a key role
in their selection. The much more bureaucratic CSU has regularly
attracted strong and visible leaders. The current chancellor has
been able to attract strong institutional leaders by reducing
bureaucratic constraints and enhancing their role in subsystem-wide
decisions. During this study, there was a great deal of turnover
in community college leadership, both at the state and institutional
levels. Michigan has attracted strong institutional leaders as
a matter of necessity. Presidents must be strong if their institutions
are to flourish because they lack the system and subsystem buffers
found in other states.
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