Federal systems have the capability of linking institutions, however
configured for governing purposes, to each other and to state
government through four central work processes: information management,
program planning, budgeting, and articulation. These work processes
are managed by a statewide agency with enough support and delegated
authority to compel institutional attention to state priorities.
Federal systems can plan on a statewide basis. They can make available
credible and timely information on system needs and system performance
to elected officials, to institutions, and to the public. They
can use program approval and program review authority to limit
program duplication and to encourage quality. They can reduce
some of the inherent conflicts in the budgeting process and link
resource allocation to system priorities. They can design and
implement articulation initiatives. If they have a large private
sector, they can involve private institutions in contributing
to the achievement of state priorities. In federal systems, legislatures
typically see themselves as custodians of institutional interests
and intervene when they disagree with the way work processes are
being used by the coordinating board.
A unified system links institutions to each other and to state
government through a single governing board and chief executive.
The effectiveness of board management of the four work processes
depends upon executive leadership. Unified systems make strong
use of strategic planning. They provide less information on performance
than federal systems partly to limit the capacity of external
actors to insert themselves into system decisions. Despite providing
less information, unified systems my communicate better with state
government because of the single contact point for the Governor
and legislators. When unified systems have constitutional status,
this autonomy helps to guard against excessive external influence.
Unified systems with strong executive leadership prevent mission
creep, ensure program quality and avoid unnecessary program duplication
through program review processes. They use the budgeting process
to support strategic objectives. The inclusion of two- and four-year
institutions in the same system promotes effective articulation
and transfer. Governing boards for unified systems do not see
the inclusion of private institutions in planning as part of their
responsibility. When elected leaders have confidence in system
leadership, the unified system requires little oversight from
state government.
Confederated systems are harder to characterize. The use of work
processes and links to state government may be different for each
subsystem. More government agencies are involved directly with
governing boards, and the Legislature often provides most of the
coordination across subsystems. Confederated systems do not appear
to have the capacity to engage in significant statewide strategic
planning even though they may have a weak coordinating structure
charged with that responsibility. In confederated systems, each
subsystem provides its own data and elected officials often suspect
that information is being provided with an "institutional spin."
In states where a statewide agency has responsibility for providing
information, results are suspect because they are based on data
provided by the subsystems. Each subsystem makes its own decisions
about which programs to offer and where, subject in some instances
to review by a statewide agency. Statewide program review procedures
are often more a formality than an actual barrier to program duplication.
Problems of unnecessary program duplication may arise either within
a subsystem or between competing subsystems. Each subsystem negotiates
its own budget with the Governor and the Legislature. Often such
negotiations are the primary or only way for state government
to influence higher education. Where subsystems lack constitutional
autonomy, legislatures may exercise direct statutory control of
operations. The absence of any buffer between state government
and subsystems on such work processes as budgeting contributes
to antagonistic relationships with the Legislature, the Governor,
or both. Where subsystems are homogeneous, the Legislature assumes
responsibility for statewide coordination. In heterogeneous subsystems,
governing boards tend to the relationships between two- and four-year
institutions. Legislatures bear most of the responsibility for
devising ways of including the private sector. Where the private
sector is strong, relationships with the public subsystems may
be competitive and antagonistic.
With the exception of budgeting, confederated institutions with
constitutional autonomy are linked neither to each other nor to
state government through any work processes other than those they
voluntarily establish. Confederated institutions lack any capacity
for statewide planning except through voluntary consensus on division
of the spoils. They determine their own missions and decide which
programs they will offer where. Voluntary program review processes
may serve to allay some policy concerns, but will not prevent
a determined institution from doing whatever it chooses. Confederated
institutions do not provide information that permits comparisons
or judgments about performance except as it may be required by
the Legislature as a condition of the budgeting process. Voluntary
agreements on articulation are a matter of institutional interpretation
and subscription. The Legislature must determine how and when
private institutions should be involved. Relationships between
elected officials and higher education leaders are cordial as
long as no one is rewarded or penalized other than through arrangements
to which those affected have previously agreed.
The character and history of state governments clearly affect
their choice of governance structures and the ways these structures
function. Historical and contextual factors such as the relative
strength of the Governor, the presence of a strong private higher
education sector, constitutional status for public institutions,
the existence of a well developed two-year college sector, collective
bargaining, and voter initiatives are all highly important in
the ways governance systems operate.
In Illinois a coordinating board interprets and implements the
priorities of a constitutionally strong Governor. In Texas a similar
governance structure serves more as a referee for the conflicting
priorities of a part-time Legislature that sees all issues of
political concern as "local." A Georgia Governor with less authority
than his Illinois counterpart achieves similar outcomes by relying
on direct interaction with a system chancellor and a unified governing
board that he appoints. To a lesser degree, constitutionally strong
Governors in New York and California pursue their priorities for
public four-year institutions through direct interactions with
subsystem chief executive officers and appointed governing boards.
The Florida Legislature relies on interactions with a strong chancellor
to achieve priorities for four-year institutions. California and
Florida have also attempted to improve accountability among community
colleges through establishing or strengthening subsystem coordinating
boards. New York assigns community colleges either to SUNY or
CUNY depending upon geographic location. Only in Michigan do elected
leaders negotiate with higher education institutions almost as
equals except for the power of the purse.
The shape of higher education in New York and Illinois has been
influenced significantly by strong private sectors. Illinois designed
structural arrangements that have produced less adversarial relationships
between the two sectors. Florida and California also have strong
private sectors, but they are overshadowed by dominant public
sectors more so than in New York and Illinois. Significant efforts
to take advantage of private sector capacity in both states are
of relatively recent origin. In California, use of the private
sector is inhibited by a constitutional prohibition against direct
support to private entities. While private institutions in Georgia
enroll more students overall (20 percent) than either Florida
or California, there is little evidence of efforts to involve
them in planning activities, perhaps because a unified governing
board with responsibilities for all public higher education institutions
views private institutions more as competitors than potential
collaborators. In Michigan, private institutions are given degree
reimbursements for degrees awarded to Michigan residents. Private
higher education does not seem to be a major influence in Texas
because of market share.
All seven states have developed extensive two-year college structures.
Florida and California require a majority of first-time students
to enter community colleges that are accessible to all geographic
regions. Illinois also planned its open-access community colleges
to serve all geographic regions, but leaves decisions about attendance
to students who may also enter relatively open-access four-year
institutions. Community colleges in Texas, New York and Michigan,
developed through varying combinations of local and state initiatives,
provide extensive but not comprehensive geographic coverage. CUNY
has been the only subsystem in any of these three states to mandate
initial matriculation for some students at community colleges.
In Georgia, two-year, degree-granting institutions were developed
by a governing board that also has responsibilities for public
four-year institutions. Significantly, two-year institutions in
Georgia developed later and were less utilized than their counterparts
in the other states.
California, Georgia and Michigan have conferred constitutional
status on some or all of their higher education institutions.
In two of these three states, this action came in response to
political intrusions. Constitutional status seems most controversial
in California, where it has created different state relationships
for UC, which enjoys constitutional status, than for CSU, which
does not. While constitutional status is a significant influence
on system design in all three states, Georgia and Michigan are
at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the relationships
between institutions and state government. In Michigan, constitutional
status poses a barrier to the relationship between institutions
and the state, while in Georgia, that barrier does not exist.
Since institutions in both state have constitutional status, this
suggests that the unified board in Georgia serves a mediating
role between the state and institutions, and helps to remove that
barrier.
The influence of faculty is strengthened by collective bargaining
laws and university senates. Texas and Georgia lack enabling legislation
for collective bargaining. University senates are not particularly
strong in either of these states. A weak bargaining statute limits
the influence of the Faculty Union for Florida's State University
System (SUS). In New York State, the effects of a strong collective
bargaining law are blunted for SUNY by arrangements that require
negotiations directly with a representative of the Governor. Faculty
play a much stronger role in CUNY, where a strong senate augments
the equally strong influence of a faculty union that negotiates
directly with CUNY's governing board. Faculty in the most prestigious
institutions in California, Illinois and Michigan have not organized,
preferring to trust their fortunes to strong faculty senates and
institutional leadership chosen with significant faculty involvement.
Less prestigious institutions in all three states have organized
for bargaining often after a history of significant conflicts
between administrations and faculty. Only California has mandated
shared authority in addition to collective bargaining. The effects
of combining the two complicate institutional leadership in CSU
and, according to many of those we interviewed, make it an impossible
task in community colleges. The level of conflict between administrative
and faculty leaders in the California Community Colleges and the
California State University is similar to the level of conflict
at CUNY, which has comparable structures for involving faculty.
Voter initiatives such as those adopted in California and Florida
limit the alternatives available to public officials and may limit
their interest in reform of higher education.
Three of the study states (Illinois, Texas and Georgia) have statewide
structural arrangements for monitoring contextual change and institutional
performance, and for coordinating strategies to reduce gaps between
changes and performance. Florida achieves similar, if less well-planned
results, through close working arrangements between an activist
Legislature and a subsystem governing board with responsibilities
for all four-year institutions. Florida copes with the effects
of having community colleges operate as separate subsystems through
a statewide coordinating structure for them and legislative management
of the interface between two- and four-year subsystems.
In New York State, the absence of a statewide structure for monitoring
and coordinating higher education, along with deep divisions in
priorities among elected leaders, has led the Governor to rely
on market forces for producing the changes he believes will keep
higher education responsive to contextual change. However, several
factors have prevented the subsystems from developing operating
efficiencies: legislative intransigence in providing managerial
flexibility at SUNY and CUNY, upstate support for keeping all
campuses of the SUNY subsystem open, and faculty union lawsuits
that are hampering CUNY.
The Governor and Legislature in California must contend with a
difficult institutional environment. Three separate subsystems,
each with its own exclusive franchise for clientele and services,
operating in the absence of any effective statewide structure
for all higher education, pose a formidable challenge to any change
that does not meet with substantial support from the affected
subsystems. Even more unwieldy than the California arrangements
are those in Michigan, where elected leaders must negotiate responses
to contextual changes on an institution-by-institution basis without
information or assistance from any effective statewide agency.
In sum, all of the study states face similar fiscal pressures,
but not all confront contextual change of equal magnitude. Illinois,
Georgia, and Michigan face only modest changes in terms of enrollment
growth. Texas, Florida, New York, and California face pressures
concerning enrollment growth, significant reduction in resources,
or both. Texas and Florida have articulated priorities and taken
steps toward attaining them. New York has placed its faith in
market forces. California, without the market influences present
in New York, must rely on subsystem planning without much state
input. Despite lesser contextual pressures, Illinois and Georgia
also have agendas for change which they are actively pursuing.
Michigan does not.
While some states set priorities and others do not, there is relatively
little disagreement across the states in terms of what they want
from their systems of higher education. Whether implicit or explicit,
all states hope their systems will provide access, equity, quality,
efficiency, and reasonable choice. They hope higher education
will contribute to state goals for economic development and that
institutions will remain affordable. They want institutions to
demonstrate reasonable productivity and to give priority to state
residents. They want undergraduate education that satisfies students
and encourages them to earn degrees on a timely basis.
The seven states exhibit four ways of responding to contextual
change. Illinois, Texas, and Georgia all have statewide structures
that engage in some form of strategic planning. The Legislature
provides a perspective in Florida that helps the state react to
immediate contextual change without giving focused attention to
longer term concerns such as enrollment growth. As previously
noted, elected leaders in New York and Michigan rely primarily
upon institutional or subsystem responses to market influences.
In California, however, where market forces are statutorily constrained
by the monopolistic status of the three subsystems, elected officials
can only hope that the aggregate responses of the three public
subsystems will equal state needs.
The seven state systems achieve different results for efficiency,
access, equity, affordability, and retention. Only in the case
of affordability, however, does there appear to be a strong link
between governance structures and performance. Families in states
that have a systemwide mechanism for representing the public interest
in budget decisions, or some device for addressing affordability
such as the California Master Plan, pay a smaller percentage of
institutional operating costs than those that lack such a mechanism.
This seems to be the case even when elected leaders have made
affordability a priority as in the highest cost state, Michigan.
Even where an agreement existed, as in California, it applied
only to the two-year segment. We conclude that affordability is
an issue on which public and institutional interests come into
conflict, and therefore creates a need for independent advocacy.
There is no evidence in our data that one type of system necessarily
has a lower cost per student than another. In other words, institutions
and subsystems with individual governing boards are not discernibly
less costly than federal or unified systems.
States do provide differing levels of choice. Factors that clearly
influence this variable include: the existence of a strong private
sector, the capacity of the state to manage and interrelate tuition
and student aid, the degree to which private institutions are
included in systemwide planning efforts, and the extent to which
a state is able to develop and preserve a viable higher education
market. Illinois and New York exhibit all four and offer the widest
range of student choices. Choice in Texas is limited by a dominant
public sector offering low tuition. Georgia, Florida, California,
and Michigan either lack the capacity to do systemwide strategic
planning or do not include the private sector. Like Texas, California
is relatively immune from market influences.
The states we studied attract different kinds of institutional
leaders. Entrepreneurial leaders who enjoy operating in the interface
between state government and institutions, and who prefer to be
free of system constraints, are drawn to Illinois, Texas and Michigan.
Leaders of four-year institutions in the remaining states devote
more of their attention to institutional concerns and must be
prepared to collaborate and compromise where institutional aspirations
conflict with system or subsystem priorities. None of the leaders
we interviewed in either setting expressed significant dissatisfaction
with the arrangements under which they worked, perhaps because
strong institutional leaders seek settings that are a reasonable
match for their strengths. Satisfaction among internal actors
does not appear to be a useful criterion for distinguishing among
the governance structures of these seven states. None of the leaders
were planning major changes in their current ways of doing business,
and nothing in our data suggests that institutions with one type
of leadership consistently outperform those with another. Absent
some preconceived theoretical notion of what constitutes "strong
institutional leadership," it is not possible on the basis of
our data to suggest that some governance structures attract stronger
leaders than others.
In relation to the states studied, Illinois, Texas, and Georgia
have the capacity to recognize and respond in organized and efficient
ways to state needs and contextual change. Florida, New York and
California have the capacity only at the subsystem levels, if
there. And Michigan does not seem to have this capacity at all
except as professional values and a marketplace dominated by the
public sector may elicit responses that are satisfactory. Nothing
that elected officials do in states with confederated systems
or confederated institutions alters performance in ways that promote
confidence about the system's capacity to respond to significant
contextual change. It is difficult to discern in these case reports
the traditional elements of the institutional autonomy/state authority
debate. Institutions in federal systems are, if anything, freer
from regulation than most of their similarly situated counterparts
in confederated systems. In both Illinois and Texas, the Legislature
keeps a watchful eye on the coordinating board to be certain it
does not overstep its authority. Sometimes, as in the case of
performance funding in Texas, the Legislature may intervene on
the side of institutions to overturn one of its own edicts. While
institutions in Georgia are subject to the oversight of a systemwide
governing board, they do not seem significantly less independent
in their internal decision making than their counterparts in other
large subsystems that are not subject to a statewide governing
board.
In federal systems, the coordinating boards prefer to build consensus
among institutions and subsystems rather than relying on authority,
which is often weak. The use of consensus building was particularly
evident in the budgeting, program review and articulation processes
used in Illinois, as well as in the development of the formulas
used to distribute state appropriations in Texas. Subsystems rely
on coordinating boards to make difficult program decisions that
might otherwise threaten cohesion. Not infrequently, as in the
case of the Illinois PQP Project, coordinating board activity
strengthens the hand of presidents in dealing with faculty resistance
to curriculum reform. Elected leaders in federal systems identify
priorities because they have the mechanisms for pursuing them.
They also have credible information to judge institutional performance.
The budget serves a strategic rather than negotiating purpose.
Except for system changes, governors and legislators intervene
directly in the management of institutions only by exception,
usually when institutional interests are threatened.
State systems with a unified or small number of subsystem governing
boards seem to invite management by strong governors and legislatures
unless protected by constitutional autonomy. Even where systems
or subsystems are protected, perceived weaknesses in leadership
may invite attempts to influence institutional actions through
the appointment of "reform board members," through annual budget
negotiations, or both. Subsystems that lack constitutional autonomy
experience heavy-handed management from strong governors and legislatures
in the form of budget reductions unrelated to fiscal shortfalls,
mandates for articulation and collaboration, restrictions on revenue
generation and expenditures, and regulation of employee relationships.
At the extreme, legislators may intervene in such normal institutional
prerogatives as faculty work load and credit hours for degrees.
In these governance structures, relationships between subsystem
executives and state government are frequently tense. Strong leadership
expands the boundaries of subsystem discretion, but cannot entirely
overcome the regulatory inclinations of elected officials and
state agencies. Strong system and subsystem leaders typically
provide institutional heads with considerable latitude on internal
decisions while enforcing strict discipline on relationships with
state government to present a united front for lobbying. Despite
direct involvement in management, elected officials generally
lack the information needed to assess institutional performance,
fail to communicate priorities effectively, and typically have
at their disposal only weak mechanisms for planning on a systemwide
basis and for encouraging collaboration across institutions and
subsystems. The elected officials are frequently dissatisfied
with responses of higher education to public interests and concerns.
Elected officials who manage higher education systems exhibit
little deference to professional values. The degree to which they
ignore such values in mandates they perceive to be in the public
interest provokes resistance and foot-dragging that not infrequently
defeats the intent of the legislation. The only unified system
we observed-Georgia's-was protected by constitutional autonomy.
At the time of our study, a well regarded board and strong executive
leadership in this system seemed to be doing an effective job
of responding to contextual change in ways that balanced professional
values and the public interest, as judged by strong support from
elected officials and the absence of their attempts to influence
institutional behavior. The absence of good information on performance
makes this assessment in part a matter of faith, as it obviously
was for Georgia's elected officials as well.
Not much can be said about the relationship between strategies
and performance in Michigan. The state uses no strategies and
appears content with whatever higher education institutions choose
to deliver. In the 1960s, such an arrangement was seen as an ideal
for relationships between higher education and state government.
As the 20th century draws to a close, however, it appears more
than a little anachronistic, even to its Michigan defenders.
Michigan's combination of constitutional autonomy and individual
governing boards for each institution maximizes the influence
of professional values. The annual budget, the only process available
to elected leaders to influence higher education, is constrained
by a legislative tradition of awarding appropriations without
regard to performance or enrollment changes. Michigan institutions
are public for the purpose of requesting state funds, but private
when it is time to account for the results. The effectiveness
of institutional governing boards in balancing the public interest
against professional values can be inferred from the cost structure.
The Legislature protects state revenues by funding institutions
at a rate that is close to the national average. Residents pick
up the difference in the form of high tuition costs. Elected leaders
make pronouncements about the importance of affordability, but
have no mechanism for limiting institutional aspirations, competition,
or program and service duplication that contribute to the high
costs.
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