Gerald L. Baliles

Gerald L. Baliles, governor of Virginia from 1986 to 1990, was chairman of the Commission on the Academic Presidency, whose report-"Stronger Leadership for Troubled Times"-was published last fall. This interview was conducted by Patrick M. Callan, Executive Director of the California Higher Education Policy Center.

 

Patrick Callan: With all the major issues higher education faces today, why single out this issue-the college and university president-as a subject for a major national commission at this time?

Gerald Baliles: I think there's a very good case for the study. Our challenges today in this country are much more complex. They're subtle and varied. We compete in an international economy, we're responding to a telecommunications revolution, we've got an older, more diversified population with all kinds of needs. And increasingly, higher education is being looked to or required to provide a lot of the knowledge and the skills and the tools for the nation to meet those challenges.

At the same time, higher education faces a wide range of problems. Public support for higher education is ambivalent, costs are rising faster than inflation, governors and legislatures are having difficulties funding other high-priority needs, and in many cases are doing so at the expense of our universities.

So leadership of higher education becomes more important than ever. It was, I think, the feeling of many, and certainly a feeling that was confirmed by the commission, that leadership in our higher education institutions is not as nimble nor as quick nor as adaptable as it could be. In fact, we found the chief executive model for higher education to be among the weakest in the country, and certainly in need of reconsideration.

PC: Why in your view is the presidency so weak, especially in relation to all these other public and private institutions? What's happened? Has it always been that way?

GB: I don't know that it's always been that way, and I'm confident that it's not that way in all institutions. But what emerged from our deliberations is a clear sense that the internal governance mechanisms of the colleges and universities are unable to keep pace with the society's demands for change.

And we found that the academic presidency has become much too weak. In part, it's because the partners in shared governance have become part of the problem. We found academic gridlock and an inability among the institutions to make decisions as quickly, as timely, and as deliberately as they need to be made.

PC: Hasn't the institutional conservatism of higher education, and its slowness to change, often been regarded in the past as one of its strengths? It doesn't go chasing fads.

GB: Without question that has been the case, and it can still be a strength. We're not suggesting that the traditional concept of shared governance be scrapped, we're simply saying it should be reformed and reshaped so that academic presidents can be more effective leaders of the institutions they head.

PC: Some critics of the report have implied, or said explicitly, that you're calling for an authoritarian presidency.

GB: That is not in the report. There is no suggestion that an authoritarian model be created. In fact, I think just the opposite. We're saying that the consent and culture of shared governance need to be revisited and reshaped so that there are clearer lines of communication among the various parties to shared governance, so that decisions can be made in a more timely fashion.

Consensus building will still be required. Leadership is more important than ever. The question is, How can you develop the consensus without leadership? Regretfully, the current system, too often, is failing higher education.

PC: If the commission's recommendations were enacted, would shared governance still be alive and well?

GB: It would be healthier. The current decision-making process has become rather complex and ill-defined. The commission found that it often blocks progress and doesn't allow the responsiveness or the decisiveness that the times require. And we found that needs to be changed if we're going to strengthen the system of higher education in this country, and that includes all the parties to shared governance.

PC: You talk a bit in the report about the difference between consensus and consultation, and then you indicate that some issues probably shouldn't be in the realm of shared governance. Is that a correct reading of the report?

GB: We're simply saying that not every decision requires endless consultation. The commission's report spoke to the need to recognize that there are some decision areas that require faculty participation, particularly curriculum and credentialing, but there are other areas, such as the color of a gymnasium roof, that don't require endless faculty debate or discussion. Between those ends of the spectrum, there is room for defining the areas appropriate for consultation, deliberation, discussion and decision.

It will be up to the parties in the various institutions to determine where, and how, those decisions are to be made. This is not so much an architectural blueprint for decision making as it is a road map for improving decision making.

PC: What did the commission mean in saying that ordinary governance should not require extraordinary leaders?

GB: Without question, there are some institutions in this country that work quite well. And in some cases we found that extraordinary leaders were able to work around the problems of shared governance, but ordinary decision making should not require endless debate and discussion.

Managing and governing academic institutions should not be so complex and overwhelming that only extraordinary leaders-rare as they are-can succeed.

PC: You also indicate that others besides the faculty have contributed to the weaker presidency that we see now, including the presidents themselves, public policy and boards.

Could you talk a bit about what you believe all these parties will have to do in order to achieve the strengthening of the presidency that the commission called for?

GB: The report clearly points out that the practice of shared governance often threatens gridlock in a lot of our academic institutions. And those partners-the president, the faculty, the boards, the political leaders-who ignore their obligations or work at cross purposes seriously threaten the ability of their institutions to respond to the challenges that confront them.

We found in too many cases that the problems of shared governance were not always recognized, and in some cases were recognized but ignored. We found that boards were either inadequately engaged with their institutions, or conversely, inappropriately involved in detail and micromanaging the institution.

We found that many trustees didn't understand the concept of service on a board as a public trust, but we also found that their states lacked clear criteria for board appointments. The institutions in some cases provided very little orientation or in-service training for board members.

We found in the political process that trustees often were appointed on the basis of their political connections and loyalty. We understand that, and we recognize that's not likely to change. But when those appointments were made without regard to the appointee's knowledge of higher education or interest in higher education or a sense of obligation to the institution, we found major problems.

We focused also on the faculty, and were concerned that, increasingly, the world view of the faculty has changed, that in many cases the loyalty of faculties has become more oriented toward their disciplines than the goals of their institution. We found that faculties often exhibit conservative reflexes about reviewing and revisiting the institution's educational programs and priorities.

In our report, we identified problems with the practice of shared governance, yet we support the concept. We believe it is important for the future viability of higher education. But we also think that the problems we identified in the report clearly call for the reforming and reshaping of the concept of shared governance, so that in practice it actually strengthens higher education.

PC: Looking at this for a moment from the outside, wearing your hat as a former governor, is the strengthened president a less accountable president?

GB: No. Actually, I think just the reverse would be the case. A strengthened presidency would not come at the expense of faculty or boards or political leaders. It would put the strengthened president in a better position to lead the institution and to improve higher education's ability to respond to the challenges of our society. It would create actually a greater degree of accountability where it can be seen and evaluated by the political leaders, by the faculty, by the boards.

As we said in our report, shared governance is not a zero-sum game, and if the academic presidency can be strengthened, it would improve and enhance the ability of others to hold someone accountable for decision making in higher education.

PC: You suggest in the report that presidents themselves bear some responsibility for the weakening of the presidency, and you describe at least a tendency of presidents to be risk-averse. You talked about needing more risk-taking presidents. How should presidents themselves look at this report and at your recommendations? What are the challenges to them?

GB: I think they should look at this as an opportunity to engage their faculties and boards in focusing on the recommendations of the report, especially those relating to improving lines of communication, reviewing areas of responsibility and charting the course for the future of their institutions. In too many cases today, presidents are being whip-sawed by an ever-growing list of concerns and interests. In our report, we described the president as the "juggler in chief."

The academic presidents, as we also point out in the report, are unlike other chief executives in their responsibilities. But in some cases we found presidents to be the source of their own difficulties. They already possess some of the authority to be much stronger leaders, but fail to exercise it for a variety of reasons. In some cases they are responsible for their inability to lead the institutions in the shaping of a vision and making the kinds of decisions that strengthen the academic institution.

But clearly, we found that the existing governance system, as it's being practiced, undermines the ability of the presidents to define an agenda, drive the issues to an acceptable conclusion and move ahead.

PC: There was a suggestion about presidential selection, that boards of trustees and campuses should cast a wider net in their searches.

GB: Yes. We recognize that different institutions at different times in their histories require different types of leaders. We're simply saying that they should not confine the search to the ranks of academia, but should look at a broader range of experience, given the kinds of decisions and financial problems now facing our higher education institutions.

We think in most cases the choices will come from within the academy, but boards should not be restricted in their search outside academia for leaders that can be strong and dynamic.

PC: I think most people would say there is an increased level of partisanship in state government. Is that a problem for the strength of the presidency in public institutions in particular?

GB: It can be, where the decisions are based more on political connections or loyalties than on qualifications.

PC: Do you mean board appointments?

GB: Yes. And when there is very little experience in understanding or managing or dealing with complex financial and management problems or organizations, then I think higher education can be in for some real difficulty. We found increasing partisanship and political considerations going into a lot of higher education decisions.

The question of accountability must be clearly understood and accepted by higher education, but the vitality and viability of higher education should not be undermined by appointments and decisions from outside academia [that are] based largely on political connections or demands that may undermine the strength of those institutions.

PC: As one who has appointed trustees yourself, what does a governor have a right to expect from a trustee in terms of loyalty, appreciation, etc.?

GB: The obligation upon appointment is to administer the affairs of the institution. As a trustee, there is a legal and fiduciary obligation to the institution that goes beyond attachment or loyalty to the appointing authority.

The board, president and faculty obviously have to wrestle with the questions of shared governance. Boards have a general obligation to work with the president in shaping a vision and determining policy and providing oversight, but to refrain from engaging in micromanagement of the institution that would cost it its independence of thinking and teaching and research that should be conducted free of political considerations.

(Copies of the governance report can be obtained by calling the publications department of the Association of Governing Boards at (800) 356-6317, or by writing to the association at One Dupont Circle, Suite 400, Washington DC, 20036. The document also is available on the Internet at www.agb.org.)