Concluding Observations

There is general satisfaction among those we spoke with concerning the structure and organization of higher education in Michigan, and there is little interest in experimenting with changes. Our respondents appreciate the autonomy of the institutions; they said they consider a little duplication of programs and a few inefficiencies as reasonable tradeoffs for a less bureaucratic structure.

The official coordination and planning functions in Michigan are technically the responsibility of the state Board of Education, but because of the constitutional status of institutions, the board effectively has no power to take on this role. Efforts to collect statewide data on performance in higher education have been challenged by institutions as infringements on their autonomy. As a result, the state places less emphasis on information collection. This scarcity of information makes it difficult to tell how efficient or inefficient the system is, or how the state is spending its money.

Constitutional status of the institutions means that policy makers have no way of setting priorities or holding institutions to those priorities except through indirect mechanisms and the budget process. Attempts to influence institutional actions, such as the 1995 tuition tax credit, are seen by institutions as micromanagement.

Although Michigan is referred to by most as a "market model," the relatively small role played by the independent institutions in the state suggests that it is really more of a public monopoly. Institutional funding typically involves incremental, across-the-board increases, and there are no mechanisms for holding institutions accountable for performance.

The Presidents Council encourages voluntary coordination and brings presidents together to reach consensus. There has generally been harmony in the system as long as the pecking order of institutions has been maintained in the budget process.

The Michigan structure, with no statewide coordinating mechanism, does not have the mediating force for conflict that other states have. The absence of such a force means that there is direct conflict between the Legislature and institutions-and among institutions. This was evident in the battles after the budget process in 1995. It is not clear, however, whether this conflict is any greater than that found in states where there is a mediating force.

Several of the individuals we spoke with feel that the independent boards are particularly important during fiscal crises. They told us that during the significant budget cuts of the 1980s, institutions were able to remain strong because governing boards pressed them to sharpen their missions and focus and prioritize their services, thereby helping them withstand the tough fiscal conditions. In a system like Michigan's, institutions-if they are well managed-may have more flexibility in economic downturns.

Most individuals within the system support the system structure and maintain that it allows institutions to be responsive to the market in the programs they offer; decisions can be made quickly about offering new programs, and there is no complicated review and approval process that needs to be conducted in order to offer what the market demands.

Although flexibility and responsiveness are advantages to the Michigan structure, there are also some disadvantages to constitutionally autonomous boards. First, it is difficult to control costs with this structure, because it is much easier for an institutional governing board to ask students to pay higher fees than it is to ask faculty to control their costs. Michigan has the highest public tuition of any of the states in this study, and affordability is a serious concern now to many policy makers in the state. Statewide boards or legislatures in systems where institutions do not have constitutional autonomy may have more success in getting institutions to control costs. In addition, it is difficult to control program duplication under this structure because the focus is more on opportunities for individual institutions rather than the overall needs of the state.

Generally, state policy makers are satisfied with the performance of higher education in Michigan. Some admit that it is inefficient and that there may be too much duplication of programs, but they are not overly concerned with this. The most significant concerns are that growing numbers of students may not be able to afford a public college education in Michigan, and that institutions may have reached the limit on increases in tuition. The system operates on the assumption that the public and professional interests are balanced through the market, and that students will not pay to attend programs or courses that they do not want.

 

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