A unique, statewide agency-the University of the State of New
York-provides limited coordination of all degree-granting public,
independent, and proprietary colleges and universities in New
York. Governance of public colleges and universities is divided
between SUNY and CUNY. The private sector dominated higher education
in New York until after World War II, and independent institutions
still enroll over forty percent of the college and university
students in New York (see Table 3). Student aid and collective
bargaining are the responsibility of separate state agencies.
Head-Count Enrollment by Sector, 1996 |
||
| SUNY | ||
| CUNY | ||
| Independents | ||
| TOTAL | ||
| Source: New York State Education Department, "New York State Summary of Degree-Credit Enrollments by Sector and Level of Institution" (Albany: 1996), not paginated. | ||
The Regents' policy priorities are, according to one of their
officers: first, quality assurance; second, long-range planning;
and third, equity and access.
The Regents consider themselves apolitical, but the process by
which they are selected is not free of party influence. When a
vacancy occurs on the Board of Regents, the chairs of the Higher
Education Committees of the two houses are notified in January,
and the Legislature, according to a legislative staff member,
"basically runs help wanted ads . . . and as many as three dozen
[respondents] may be interviewed by the committees." The leadership
makes its selection, and, by joint resolution, the Legislature
then elects the leadership's choice. If a joint resolution is
not adopted by the first Tuesday of March, then on the second
Tuesday, both houses meet in joint session to fill the vacancy.
At present, the Democrats, who outnumber Republicans in such a
joint session, control the process. Republicans boycotted a recent
joint session. A former SUNY chancellor stated that the Regents
"do get some good people despite the process for selecting them."
New York's governors, according to a former commissioner, "have
generally resented the independence of the Regents, and have seen
them as a legislative adjunct." For example, the Regents' statewide
plan requires gubernatorial approval, but Governor Cuomo took
two years to approve the first plan sent to him, and never acted
on subsequent ones. Governor Pataki called for the elimination
of the Regents' planning function, but a compromise resulted in
lengthening the planning cycle from four to eight years.
The Regents' broad responsibilities for elementary and secondary
education and the pervasive problems in that area severely limit
the time, energy and interest that the Regents can devote to higher
education. Unlike state higher education agencies in several other
states, the Regents have not initiated proposals for higher education
for many years.
A former SUNY chancellor described the Regents as "a very strong board with a great deal of authority," but said that they do not play a significant policy role in higher education. A senior CUNY officer agreed, but noted the value of the Regents' periodic review of doctoral programs and the link that the Regents provide between the public schools and four-year teacher education programs.
Elected in November 1994 on a platform that promised to cut taxes
and shrink government, Governor Pataki submitted his first budget
for 1995-96 to the Legislature in January 1995. This budget proposed
a 31.5 percent reduction in appropriations for SUNY and a 27 percent
reduction for CUNY. Both systems objected strongly on the grounds
that reductions of such magnitude would require tuition increases
that would damage student access. The SUNY Trustees, most of whom
were holdover appointments of the previous Governor, argued that
closure of some SUNY campuses would be necessary. According to
an executive aide, the SUNY Trustees did not try to work with
the Governor. A senior SUNY administrator, on the other hand,
said that the chair of the Trustees tried unsuccessfully to arrange
a meeting with the Governor. Soon afterward, the Governor replaced
seven trustees whose terms had expired. Although these replacements
were likely in any event, they were, according to an executive
aide, "in some ways a punishment of the . . . SUNY board" for
their "very reactionary response" to the Governor's budget.
Opposition from the Legislature as well as from the higher education
community led to a budget compromise that restored some of the
proposed cuts, but still reduced state support significantly and
required steep tuition increases. In return, each system was required
to produce a plan, due in December 1995, that would address issues
of efficiency and cost-effectiveness and would focus on long-term
strategies as opposed to short-term tactics such as deferring
maintenance or freezing hiring. Moreover, the long-term plans
would not rely on tuition increases or campus closures. Both systems
submitted plans as required.
The 1996-97 Governor's budget again proposed reductions for SUNY
and CUNY, and again the Legislature rejected many of these cuts.
The Governor included several recommendations from SUNY's December
1995 report, Rethinking SUNY, in his budget. The major such recommendation proposed by the
Governor and adopted by the Legislature created provisions that
allow reserve funds, which would have otherwise reverted to the
state, to be carried forward to the next year by the campuses.
The Legislature rejected recommendations for a single budget line
for the system and for differential tuition across SUNY campuses.
Legislators also made it clear that the increases to the Governor's
budget were provided to avoid SUNY's needing a tuition increase
(CUNY had not sought an increase).
SUNY's 30 community colleges have "local sponsors" (usually one
or more counties), whose financial contribution should not, by
law, fall below 26.2 percent of the operating budget. Most community
colleges are governed by their own nine-member board of trustees,
with five members appointed by the local sponsor and four by the
Governor.
Enrollment
As Table 4 indicates, enrollment at SUNY has declined over the
past five years. The decline could be attributable to sharp increases
in tuition or to declines in the number of high school graduates.
(The number of high school graduates in New York declined from
over 240,000 in 1979 to about 158,500 in 1993.)
SUNY Full-Time Equivalent Enrollment, 1990 and 1995 |
|||
| Source: New York State Education Department, "New York State Summary of Degree-Credit Enrollments." | |||
Mission
SUNY is responsible for all public campuses in the state other
than those governed by CUNY. This responsibility for diverse institutions
precludes the system from adopting a precise mission. SUNY's statutory
mission is to provide "educational services of the highest quality,
with the broadest possible access, fully representative of all
segments of the population in a complete range of academic, professional
and vocational programs." Regarding priorities, a former SUNY
senior officer suggested that SUNY is more focused on quality
than CUNY, the latter giving more emphasis to access. A SUNY college
president agreed that emphasis on access is diminished, but was
uncertain whether this was "a matter of policy or just a function
of the budget."
Central Office and Campus Relationships
Candidates for president at each campus are screened by the local
campus board, which recommends a single candidate to the chancellor,
who recommends that candidate to the Board of Trustees for approval.
Although the candidate is appointed by the state board, this procedure
inspires little loyalty to the system; the primary goal of campus
heads is to be supportive of their individual campuses. In early
1996, the board questioned the chancellor's practice of presenting
only a single candidate for appointment. This is one of several
areas of disagreement between the chancellor and the board that
eventually led to the chancellor's resignation in spring 1996.
Tuition
SUNY's Board of Trustees has responsibility for setting tuition
at the state-operated campuses, though the Legislature can influence
the level of tuition through specific language calling for limited
or no tuition increases. Undergraduate tuition at SUNY's four-year
institutions averaged $3,400 in 1995-96, a 28 percent increase
over the previous year. SUNY's community colleges set their own
tuition. For 1995-96, community college tuition averaged $2,167,
a ten percent increase over 1994-95. From 1990 to 1995, tuition
increased 127 percent at the state-operated campuses and 58 percent
at the community colleges.
The December 1995 Plan
SUNY experienced a wide range of transitions in 1995. During that
year, a new chancellor, appointed before Governor Pataki's election,
was brought in from outside the system. Seven new trustees were
later appointed to the SUNY board by the new Governor to replace
those whose terms had expired. Many respondents said that the
new trustees were appointed to bring the Governor's priorities
for reduced state expenditures to SUNY. Several interviewees also
said that SUNY will be required to tighten its fiscal belt in
the coming years.
Respondents' views on the impact of the new trustees were varied.
At one extreme, a college president said that "the governing board
is hell-bent on destroying the university." On the other hand,
this same respondent criticized the former board as an "absentee
board," saying that "they didn't show up or read the materials."
He added, however, that "they'd go along and vote the right way."
Others see the new trustees as an advantage in providing "access
to the new Governor, which SUNY would not" otherwise have. A faculty
member commented on the willingness of the new board members to
listen to faculty concerns, and suggested that the new board members
had not yet had time to become advocates for SUNY. The former
chancellor who resigned because of disputes with the board seemed
to agree, but later noted his approval of the board's selection
of his successor, saying that such selection indicated "that the
trustees have had time to learn about SUNY."
The 1995-96 budget negotiations gave some indication of changes
that may be in store. Governor Pataki's initial budget proposed
a $290 million cut for SUNY to be offset by tuition increases
and expenditure reductions. The Legislature ultimately approved
a reduction of about $185 million, with an understanding that
there would be no campus closures. The campus closure ban seems attributable to the political clout
of SUNY's geographically dispersed campuses; "every senator has a SUNY campus in his district," we were told
by one respondent. Tuition increased dramatically from 1994-95,
by 28 percent in the four-year institutions and 10 percent in
the community colleges. In addition, the Legislature required that SUNY submit a "multiyear,
comprehensive, systemwide plan to increase cost efficiency" in
December 1995.
A senior SUNY administrator doubted that the Legislature expected
much from its request for a plan, but said that the "Trustees
decided to dig into the requirement." The plan that was submitted,
Rethinking SUNY, was written, according to most respondents, under the direct
guidance of the Trustees, who established four committees for
that purpose. A campus president and a number of vice presidents
staffed the committees, and were supported by senior staff from
the central office. A SUNY campus president said, "one of the
problems with the approach to the December first report is that
the board members do not trust SUNY central. They are working
with the presidents rather than the central administration."
Rethinking SUNY calls for giving additional authority to the campuses, reducing
central office staff by 30 percent, allowing differential tuition
at the campuses, increasing faculty productivity, promoting "strategic
alliances" among campuses, and shifting two of the three SUNY
hospitals to local nonprofit organizations. Although most of these
proposals have been under discussion in the state for some time
and some would require legislative approval, the plan is significant
as an aggregation of a range of proposals by those-the Trustees-who
are primarily responsible for implementing them. Several of these
proposals were included in the Governor's budget, but, according
to a senior SUNY administrator, they were not high priorities
when the Governor negotiated the budget, and therefore were not
adopted by the Legislature.
In at least two respects (regarding campus closure and the statutory
colleges), the plan does not go as far as some, inside and outside
of SUNY, had either feared or hoped. Both of these issues are
highly controversial, and both appear to have been finessed in
the report.
Campus Closure. SUNY has many small campuses that are widely dispersed across the state, either as political rewards for a community or to assure wide access for students. Whatever the reason, it is generally believed that SUNY is "overbuilt," but political reality has prevented simple closure of selected campuses, whether for economic or programmatic reasons. A senior SUNY administrator noted that "almost all the SUNY campuses are in Republican districts." Before the report was issued, both a former chancellor and a state executive staff member described what appears to be one strategy in the plan: give the campuses greater autonomy and let the market force mergers or closures.>
The Statutory Colleges. The five statutory colleges are the College of Ceramics at Alfred University and the colleges of Veterinary Medicine, Agriculture and Life Science, Ecology, and Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell. The plan emphasizes the fiscal aspects of this relationship: In "1988 tax dollars . . . State University's core operating budget [was] $1.18 billion, with statutory colleges receiving $108.4 million. By 1995, the numbers were $733.1 million and $118 million respectively." The plan states that the board has initiated discussions with the two private campuses to work toward financial solutions. More fundamental questions about the value of the statutory college model were not raised. These colleges are only nominally part of SUNY. Should they remain so? Or could the model be extended?
CUNY's four- and two-year colleges are governed by the Board of
Trustees, which is comprised of 17 members, 10 appointed by the
Governor and 5 appointed by the mayor of New York City. These
trustees serve seven-year terms and must be confirmed by the Senate;
a student and a faculty member serve ex officio for one-year terms.
Enrollment
Despite increases in tuition, enrollment at CUNY increased from
1990 to 1995, as shown in Table 5. Increases were attributed to
the large numbers of immigrants entering the city and a relatively
poor job market.
CUNY Full-Time Equivalent Enrollment, 1990 and 1995 |
|||
| 96,098 | |||
| 100,457 | |||
| Source: New York State Education Department, "New York State Summary of Degree-Credit Enrollments." | |||
Mission
CUNY, unlike SUNY-indeed, unlike most complex, multicampus systems-has
an explicit mission, one dating in substance from the founding
in 1847 of the Free Academy, the predecessor of City College.
The statutory mission, which is broadly accepted within CUNY,
calls for "the strongest commitment to the special needs of an
urban constituency." In particular, a senior CUNY officer mentioned
that he believes that CUNY benefits from the views of state residents
"about immigrants in the best possible sense of that word. They
are not anti-immigrant, and they remain proud of the city's role
in providing immigrants with the first step up of upward mobility."
One benefit of the explicit mission can be found in the good relationship
between the Board of Trustees and the central office; an administrator
at the central office described the Trustees' "loyalty and dedication
to the university despite six-hour meetings, the lousy food they
serve them, and the tension."
Central Office and Campus Relationships
Well known campuses-Hunter, Queens, Brooklyn, and City College
of New York-enjoyed substantial autonomy prior to their consolidation
into CUNY in 1961. For several years, it was unclear whether the
founding chancellor would be able to exercise the central authority
commonly associated with the position. But the present perception
seems to be in line with the words of a legislative aide, who
said, "CUNY tends to be much more of a system than SUNY." This
is variously attributed to geographic proximity, the model of
the systemwide Graduate Center, a relatively specific mission,
and the absence of the "prestige pyramid" found in SUNY. A senior
CUNY officer said that it must "focus academically on what we
need to do for students now, rather than on what we were doing
20 years ago. We need to start acting more like a system than
20 unique colleges." He added that systemwide accounting and computing
services were being initiated. One campus head strongly agreed:
"Looking at issues of access and quality across campuses and asking
questions about the best models for using resources is a move
to make CUNY a university rather than a federated system of colleges."
Another campus head said that the system is necessary, but that
as presently organized, it does not allow sufficient flexibility
to each campus to meet hard financial times.
The CUNY board took several controversial actions to respond to
the recent budget cutbacks, actions that have been widely criticized
by faculty and employee groups. In the summer of 1995, the CUNY
board declared that the system was in a state of "financial exigency,"
which allowed it to take some cost-saving actions permitted by
state law only in times of fiscal crisis. The board voted to terminate
159 tenured faculty and to "abolish, consolidate, or merge" over
30 academic programs at its four-year institutions. Several groups,
including the professionals' union and Faculty Senate, brought
a lawsuit against the board for taking these actions. In April
1996, a state court invalidated the Trustees' actions, arguing
that the state of fiscal emergency identified in February 1995
with the Governor's proposed budget had largely disappeared by
June 1995 when the Board voted on the cost-cutting measures. This
ruling was overturned in December 1996 by a state appellate court,
which ruled that the Trustees had acted "properly and in good
faith" in their declaration of a fiscal emergency. This action
clears the way for the original board action. Prior to either
the lower court or appellate ruling, however, the board declared
a second state of fiscal emergency in March 1996, this time just
for the four-year colleges, "paving the way for possible layoffs
of more than 1,300 faculty and staff members." The court rulings
do not affect this most recent declaration.
The December 1995 Plan
In 1995, the Legislature requested multiyear plans from both SUNY
and CUNY that would improve the efficiency of system and campus
operations. The Legislature qualified the request to CUNY, however,
specifying that it outline "its progress on and proposals for
. . . efforts to improve program quality and efficiency." This
qualification recognized that CUNY had already initiated on-going
program review in 1991. This review has resulted in "campus decisions
to suspend, consolidate or close 128 programs during" the three
years prior to the submission of CUNY's response to the Legislature
in December 1995.
The December 1 Report outlined several actions undertaken by CUNY to improve quality and efficiency, including: 1) attempts to restructure areas such as freshmen assessment, remediation, basic skills, and English as a Second Language (ESL); 2) encouragement of strong campus-based planning and distinct campus missions; 3) periodic review of all degree programs including guidelines for determining when program suspension, closure and consolidation should occur; and 4) efforts to improve instructional productivity and to find efficiencies in campus operations.
Prior to the mid-1960s, a merit-based student aid program benefited
private institutions, as well as covering the full cost of tuition
at SUNY. Increasing costs at the private campuses required increased
tuition, and their competitive position vis-a-vis SUNY declined.
Governor Rockefeller, concerned about the financial viability
of the private sector, appointed a commission headed by McGeorge
Bundy to explore the problem. The commission's recommendations
resulted in legislation establishing "Bundy Aid," essentially
unrestricted aid directly paid to independent colleges and universities
based on the number of degrees awarded.
Bundy Aid is administered by the Regents. The Legislature rejected
Governor Pataki's proposal in 1996 to transfer the program to
the Higher Education Services Corporation. From 1990 to 1992,
state funding for Bundy Aid declined from approximately $100 million
to some $40 million, and has remained relatively constant since
then. In 1995, the private sector urged the Legislature to raise the
appropriation to the maximum statutory limit of $120 million,
but the increase of $2 million in the 1996-97 budget fell far
short of that. A state agency official suggested that the decline
in support has been attributable to perceptions "that public higher
education is purposeful, while private higher education is elite."
A SUNY administrator said that there is usually close cooperation
between the public and private sectors on issues regarding support
for students and student financial aid, but that "there are major
differences on issues of institutional aid." Many in the private
sector, however, believe that need-based Tuition Assistance Program
(TAP) awards, originally intended largely for students in the
private sector, are now disproportionately used by students in
the public sector.
A private university president predicted that the independent sector, depending on the state fiscal situation, will fare better under Governor Pataki than in the recent past. In 1995, CICU staff members noted their concern that some public community college students received a full federal Pell Grant and also the maximum state TAP entitlement. The Governor's 1996 budget proposed taking into account the availability of federal student aid in calculating TAP awards, following the recommendation of the independent colleges and universities. This proposal was rejected by the Legislature.
An officer of the Services Corporation said, "there has been pressure
in New York to maintain access possibly at the expense of excellence."
He suggested greater focus on results, noting that private institutions
have had better results with minority students than the public
ones have had. He said that accountability is more important than
system governance in achieving results.
The major student aid program in New York is the need-based Tuition
Assistance Program (TAP), an entitlement program for students.
TAP was initiated in 1974 as a need-based program to help students
attend the institution of their choice. In particular, it was
designed to maintain access to the independent institutions. In
1992-93 for the first time, the amount of TAP money going to students
at public institutions surpassed that going to students at private
institutions. Table 6 shows the distribution of TAP awards in
1990-91 and 1995-96.
Distribution of TAP Awards, 1990 and 1995 |
|||
1990 to 1995 |
|||
| CUNY | |||
| SUNY | |||
| Independents | |||
| Other | |||
| TOTAL | |||
| Source: The University of the State of New York, State Education Department, Annual Report by the Board of Regents to the Governor and Legislature on Student Financial Aid Programs (Albany: 1991 to 1996 editions). | |||
The cut-off point for TAP eligibility is taxable income of approximately
$50,000. About 40 percent of the students at SUNY and in the private
institutions receive TAP awards; at CUNY about 70 percent do.
Since 1990, TAP funding has increased from just under $400 million
to over $600 million because of its entitlement nature and because
of increases in tuition in the public sector.
In the 1995-96 state budget, a cap of 90 percent of tuition at
CUNY and SUNY was placed on TAP awards, reflecting the belief
that students "should have to pay something in tuition and fees."
The Governor's 1996-97 budget called for a $125 million cut in
TAP spending. The cut, which was supported by the independent
institutions, would have resulted from a change in the calculation
of TAP eligibility. If the proposal had passed, Pell Grants that
students receive would be factored into the calculation of their
TAP awards, so that the combined TAP and Pell awards could not
exceed tuition for those with no net income. This would lessen
the TAP award received by the poorest students, and would primarily
affect students at CUNY and SUNY. This proposal was not approved
by the Legislature, and the Governor's proposed $125 million cut
was rejected.
The faculty and professional staff at SUNY's state-operated colleges
are represented in collective bargaining by the United University
Professions, an AFL-affiliate with about 22,000 members. The Governor
negotiates with the union through his Office of Employee Relations.
Non-teaching employees-for example, clerical and security employees-are
represented by other statewide unions, and bargaining for these
employees takes place along with that of other state agencies.
SUNY's classified staff are part of the state-classified civil
service system, so SUNY hires from these state lists. Governors
have generally accepted the results of collective bargaining in
preparing state budget requests. For the community colleges, bargaining
is done by local unions.
SUNY officers sit in on the collective bargaining negotiations.
According to one such officer, although the SUNY officers are
sometimes consulted, their participation is "only pro forma." Some trustees and institutional leaders believe that SUNY itself
should do the bargaining. And some SUNY campus presidents believe
that bargaining should take place at the campus level. A former
chancellor said that the contract is not with SUNY but with the
state, adding that it is a strong management contract that does
not bind SUNY to salary scales, but that allows SUNY to match
salary offers and discharge tenured professors.
Relationships between the faculty union and the SUNY Faculty Senate,
often contentious in the past, are said to be good, both working
together to improve the dialogue with board members. The union,
according to a member of the Faculty Senate, bargains over "terms
and conditions of employment for faculty, while the systemwide
Faculty Senate serves as an advisor to the chancellor on education
policy issues." A senior SUNY administrator agreed that there
is a division of responsibility between these two organizations,
but said the division is not quite so clear-cut.
CUNY: The System at the Bargaining Table
The CUNY faculty are represented by the Congress of Federated
Unions, and the CUNY central office conducts collective bargaining
negotiations. As a result of the academic planning program reviews,
over 100 tenured faculty members were laid off in 1995. Both the
faculty union and the Faculty Senate sued CUNY over these layoffs,
and had initial success in the court. The lower court decision,
however, was overturned by an appellate court in December 1996.
As an aside on unions, CUNY provides over two-thirds of the public school teachers in New York City, while the teachers' union controls jobs. CUNY's efforts to provide more science and mathematics teachers have run into difficulties because teachers' union rules allow more senior teachers to bump newer teachers even for those positions where the more senior teachers may be only marginally qualified.
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